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NOTE
LARGE-SIZED SODA BAN AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO SODA TAX
Hery (Michelle) Min*
This Note examines New York City’s Sugary Drinks Portion Cap
Rule (Soda Ban), which was originally set to become effective March 12,
2013.  The New York County Supreme Court’s decision in New York
Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene suspended the Soda Ban
on March 11, 2013.  The First Department of the Appellate Division of
New York State Supreme Court affirmed the suspension on July 30, 2013.
However, the complex economic policy and constitutional issues arising
from the proposed Soda Ban deserve as much attention as the ultimate
result of the legal challenge to the ban.  Both courts struck down the
Soda Ban on the grounds that it violated the separation of powers doc-
trine.  The lower court further held that the Soda Ban was arbitrary and
capricious. This Note does not focus solely on the holdings of the two
courts, but takes a broader approach in analyzing the issues involved in
the Soda Ban.
By comparing and contrasting tobacco products with sugary bever-
ages, this Note explains why the public seems to find the Soda Ban less
appealing than tobacco regulations.  Specifically, this Note addresses
how the failed attempts of numerous states and cities to implement soda
taxes demonstrate the complexity of policies geared toward curbing
obesity; how fundamental values, such as  health, fairness, efficiency,
and autonomy factor into obesity policies; and the fact that legislatures
and courts are struggling to determine the scope of public health law
intervention.  The Note explores how the Soda Ban, despite its judicial
suspension, could represent a stepping-stone in combating the obesity
epidemic.
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INTRODUCTION
In the opinion pages of the New York Times, Casey Neistat, a New
York-based filmmaker wrote that “it is evident that some people just
aren’t responsible enough to feed themselves.”1  An overwhelming num-
ber of studies indicate that the U.S. obesity epidemic is a growing prob-
lem with serious implications.2  For example, a study by the Obesity
Task Force, an organization comprised of commissioners from eleven
New York City agencies as well as representatives from the New York
City mayor’s office, notes that 58% of adults—or a total of 3,437,000
people—in New York City are overweight or obese.3  The study con-
cludes that obesity is “a leading cause of preventable death, second only
to tobacco, and kills 5,800 New York City residents per year.4  Cur-
rently, New York City’s adult obesity rates not only exceed the national
average,5 but also force the City to spend $4 billion a year in obesity-
1 Casey Neistat, ‘Soda Ban Explained’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/09/10/opinion/soda-ban-explained.html.
2 Obesity is defined as having a body mass index (BMI) of thirty or higher, where the
BMI is calculated using body weight and height.  Eric Zuehlke, For Women in the U.S., Obes-
ity Links to Socioeconomic Status and Poor Diet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Apr.
2010), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/usobesity.aspx.
3 Reversing the Epidemic: The New York City Obesity Task Force Plan to Prevent and
Control Obesity, OBESITY TASK FORCE 4 (May 31, 2012), www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/
otf_report.pdf [hereinafter Reversing the Epidemic].
4 Id.
5 Id.
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related medical costs.6  In particular, New York State Comptroller
Thomas P. DiNapoli estimated that in 2012, New York’s Medicaid pro-
gram, which is funded by federal, state and local taxes, spends more than
$4.3 billion a year and private insurance and Medicare pay out $ 7.5
billion a year for obesity-related expenditures.7  In 2004, recognizing the
dire situation of health and cost burden of obesity, the Medicare program
revised its coverage policy to classify obesity as a disease.8  Furthermore,
in 2006, Medicare began to cover bariatric surgery for the treatment of
obesity.9  The motive behind the state and federal governments’ deep
involvement in attempting to fund obesity-related medical costs may be
due to the fact that obesity affects some ethnic group or socioeconomic
group more than others.  For example, a study found that non-Hispanic
blacks have the highest age-adjusted rates of obesity (49.5%) compared
with Mexican Americans (40.4%), all Hispanics (39.1%) and non-His-
panic whites (34.3%).10  Also, the National Health and Nutrition Exami-
nation Survey found that obesity prevalence is similar at all income
levels among men, but higher income women are less likely to be obese
than low income women.  Survey results also showed that while there is
no significant trend between obesity and education among men, women
with college degrees are less likely to be obese compared with less edu-
cated women.11
6 Neistat, supra note 1.  The effects of obesity on health care costs exceed and the
effects on the number of chronic conditions are larger than those of smoking or problem drink-
ing.  Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking, and Drinking on Medical Problems and
Costs, 21 Health Affairs 245, 246–48 (2002), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/con-
tent/21/2/245.full.pdf (“In terms of absolute changes in costs for impatient and ambulatory
care (which probably understate true absolute effects because of underrerporting), obesity is
associated with an average increase of $395 per year, overweight with an increase of $125,
current or ever smoking about $230, problem drinking with $150, and aging with $225.”).
7 Press Release, News from the Office of New York State Comptroller, Report: Soaring
Health Care Costs Highlight Need to Address Childhood Obesity (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www
.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/oct12/102412.htm.
8 See Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 18,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/business/ama-recognizes-obesity-as-a-disease
.html.
9 Memorandum from the Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. on Coverage Decision
for Bariatric Surgery for the Treatment of Morbid Obesity (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.cms
.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=160&ver=32&Nca
Name=Bariatric+Surgery+for+the+Treatment+of+Morbid+Obesity+%281st+Recon%29&bc=
BEAAAAAAEAgA.
10 Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence of Obesity and Trends in the Distribution of
Body Mass Index Among US Adults, 1999-2000, 307 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 491, 493 (note Table
2-Prevalence of Obesity (BMI =30) and Overweight and Obesity Combined (BMI =25) for
Adults Aged 20 Years and Older: NHANES 2009-2010).
11 Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Obesity and Socioeconomic Status in Adults: United States,
2005-2008. NCHS DATA BRIEF, NO. 50 (National Center for Health Statistics, MD) Dec. 2010,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db50.pdf.
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The fact that many New Yorkers have struggled to independently
improve their eating habits suggests that government intervention may be
helpful to both improve the health of New York City residents and re-
duce the City’s medical costs.12  As the results of the implementation of
tobacco taxes and fast food regulations over the past decade demonstrate,
government intervention can be used to shape individual behavior and
industry norms to benefit the public interest.13  Likewise, New York
City’s proposed ban on large sugary drinks may be used to curb obesity
and obesity-related medical costs.
New York City’s Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule, proposed by
Mayor Michael Bloomberg in May 30, 2012, and approved by the New
York City Board of Health in September 13, 2012, prohibits food-ser-
vices establishments that are subject to the city’s health department from
selling sodas and other sugary drinks in containers larger than sixteen
ounces.14  It is important to note that although the proposed ban on large
12 Multiple factors determine a person’s weight, such as genetics, metabolism, behavior,
environment, culture, and socioeconomic influences.  Todd J. Zywicki et al., Obesity and Ad-
vertising Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 979 (2004).  The OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) noted in a report published in September 23, 2010,
“Obesity and the Economics of Prevention: Fit not Fat,” that individual interventions have a
relatively limited impact, that multiple interventions that can bring fundamental changes in
social norms are necessary, and that governments need to intervene to make the social environ-
ment more conducive to healthier practices.  Marion Nestle, Americans Beat 33 Countries to
Win OECD Obesity Prize, FOOD POLITICS (Sep. 24, 2010), http://www.foodpolitics.com/2010/
09/americans-beat-33-countries-to-win-oecd-obesity-prize.  More importantly, The New En-
gland Journal of Medicine found in a study that “the genetic association with adiposity ap-
peared to be more pronounced with greater intake of sugar-sweetened beverages.”  Qibin Qi et
al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Genetic Risk of Obesity, 367 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1387,
1387 (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa1203039.
13 See e.g., Amanda MacMillan, NYC’s Fat Ban Paying Off, CNN (July 16, 2012), http://
edition.cnn.com/2012/07/16/health/nyc-fat-ban-paying-off (reporting on a study by New York
City health officials which found that the five year old ban on the use of trans fat-containing
foods or using ingredients that contain 0.5 grams or more of trans fat per serving in the city’s
restaurants that was phased in between 2007 and 2008 had sharply reduced the consumption of
the unhealthy fats among fast-food customers.  The ban was estimated to have caused a drop
of 2.5 to three grams in the average trans fat content of customers’ meals, illustrating that
“health regulations at the local level can have a measurable effect on public consumption.”).
A study found that strong local restaurant smoking regulations are associated with reduced
environmental tobacco smoke exposure among youths.  Siegel et al., Effect of Local Restau-
rant Smoking Regulations on Environmental Tobacco Smoke Exposure Among Youths, 94 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 321, 325 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1448250/pdf/0940321.pdf.
14 Vivian Yee, Your Guide to New York’s Soda Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/your-guide-to-new-yorks-soda-ban/ [hereinafter
Guide to New York Soda Ban]; see also Michael M. Grynbaum, Soda Makers Begin Their
Push Against New York Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/
nyregion/in-fight-against-nyc-soda-ban-industry-focuses-on-personal-choice.html?pagewanted
=all [hereinafter Soda Makers Push Against New York Ban]; Jill Colvin, New York Soda Ban
Approved: Board of Health Oks Limiting Sale of Large-Sized, Sugary Drinks, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sep. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13/new-york-approves-soda-
ban-big-sugary-drinks_n_1880868.html.
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sugary drinks is commonly referred to as a “Soda Ban,” the ban would
actually include many other types of sugary beverages such as fruit-fla-
vored drinks, sports drinks, energy drinks, presweetened black coffee and
teas, and hot chocolate.15  Specifically, the Soda Ban defines “sugary
drink” as:
[A] carbonated or non-carbonated beverage that is non-
alcoholic; is sweetened by the manufacture or establish-
ment with sugar or another caloric sweetener; has greater
than 25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of beverage; and does
not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk substi-
tute by volume as an ingredient.16
The proposed ban further provides that self-service cups—cups or con-
tainers provided by a food service establishment and filled by the con-
sumer—are also subject to the sixteen ounce limit.17
Although state legislatures have often introduced soda tax poli-
cies,18 these policies, with the exception of small sales taxes on sugary
beverages,19 have either been repealed or have not been implemented,
mainly due to fierce resistance by lobbyists.20  Adam Smith stated in
1776 that “[s]ugar, rum, and tobacco are commodities which are nowhere
necessaries of life, which are become objects of almost universal con-
sumption, and which are therefore extremely proper subjects of taxa-
tion.”21  Over two centuries later, sugar is the anomaly of Smith’s
15 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12, slip op. 5505 at 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t, July
30, 2013).  Note that the rule contains carve-outs for alcoholic beverages, milkshakes, fruit
smoothies, mixed coffee drinks, mochas, lattes, and 100% fruit juices. Id. Thus, the term
“soda,” as used throughout this Note, includes all drinks affected by the New York Soda Ban.
16 R.C.N.Y. tit.24, § 81.53(a) (proposed).  In sum, major exceptions to the Soda Ban
include drinks with more than 50% milk (or milk substitute), beverages with less than twenty-
five calories per eight ounces like diet sodas, and alcoholic beverages. Guide to New York
Soda Ban, supra note 14.
17 R.C.N.Y. tit. 24, § 81.53(a), (c) (proposed).
18 Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack
Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 856 (2000) (note Table 2—Repealed
Soft Drink and Snack Food Taxes), available at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/jacobson.pdf.
19 Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009), available at http://www
.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhpr0905723.
20 Paul Bedard, Voters Say Don’t Tax My Soda Pop, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), http://
www.usnews.com/news/washington-whispers/articles/2010/11/12/voters-say-dont-tax-my-
soda-pop.  For example, soft drink and snack food taxes have been repealed in a handful of
states, including Maryland, Ohio, New York, and Washington. See Jacobson & Brownell,
supra note 18, at 856.
21 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 889 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).
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triumvirate, remaining largely untaxed while alcohol and tobacco are
routinely taxed.22
While some argue that government regulation of diet is an over-
reach into people’s lives,23 government intervention in a market is war-
ranted when market failures cause suboptimal consumption.24  Market
failure refers to problems in the decision-making process, and markets
may fail in cases of information deficits, externalities, and lack of ration-
ality.25  Market failures are present in the soda industry due to consum-
ers’ time-inconsistent preferences, which provide short-term gratification
but long-term harm; financial externalities caused by the fact that con-
sumers do not bear the full costs of their consumption decisions; and
consumers’ ignorance of the negative effects that soda can have on their
health, which causes them to make consumption decisions based on im-
perfect information.26  Because various factors, such as the definition of
regulated beverages, the type of regulation applied, and regulation con-
tent itself27 will determine the legality of a soda ban and the ban’s effect
on soda consumption, only a sophisticated and well-tailored ban policy
could accomplish its goals with minimal burden on beverage companies
and consumers.  While the Soda Ban may not be perfect, it is sophisti-
cated enough to be considered legitimate and to accomplish its goal of
inducing people make healthier choices.
Although New York’s 2009 attempt to implement a statewide soda
tax was abandoned, its spirit lives.28  On September 19, 2012, the New
York City Board of Health approved Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s pro-
22 See J. Angelo DeSantis, Formulating a Soda Tax Fit for Consumption: A Pragmatic
Approach to Implementing the Failed New York Soda Tax, 16 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 363,
370–71 (2012).
23 See Neil H. Buchanan, Soft Drinks, Taxes, and Regulation: Why the Attacks on Mayor
Bloomberg’s Proposed Size Restrictions on Soda Servings Are Misplaced, VERDICT.JUSTIA
.COM (July 12, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/07/12/soft-drinks-taxes-and-regulation
(noting that the strategy of the soda makers is to make the Soda Ban “a debate about freedom,
not fatness,” but arguing that “Bloomberg’s approach is no more an attack on people’s free-
dom than are traffic lights, or laws against lying to consumers,” and “steering people away
from harmful behavior in all these diverse ways is the very essence of good public policy.”).
24 See John Cawley, An Economic Framework for Understanding Physical Activity and
Eating Behaviors, 27 AM. J. PREV. MED. 117, 120 (2004).
25 See id.
26 Brownell et al., supra note 19, at 1601–02.
27 For consideration of such issues in the context of sugary-sweetened beverage taxes,
see Leslie McGranahan & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Who Would Be Affected by Soda
Taxes?, CHI. FED LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chicago, Ill.) (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2011/cflmarch2011_
284.pdf.
28 In 2009, New York State proposed $0.01 per ounce tax on soda and other sweet
drinks.  Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an Antitax
Message, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/nyregion/03sodatax
.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0.
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posal to ban the sale of large sugary beverages, an unprecedented restric-
tion in the United States.29  The measure was planned to take effect
starting March 2013.30  However the plan was struck down by Judge
Milton A. Tingling of the New York County Supreme Court in Manhat-
tan on March 11, 2013.31  Although the Bloomberg administration ap-
pealed in June,32 the First Department of the Appellate Division of New
York State Supreme Court in Manhattan upheld Judge Tingling’s ruling
on July 30, 2013.33
The Soda Ban prohibits New York City restaurants, movie theaters,
food carts, sports stadiums, and other city-regulated food service estab-
lishments from serving sugary drinks in sizes larger than sixteen
ounces.34  However, unlike an absolute ban, Mayor Bloomberg’s plan
exempts many businesses and types of beverages.  First, the Soda Ban
does not apply to businesses that are not subject to inspection by the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) under
the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DOHMH
and New York State’s Department of Agriculture and Marketing.35  Such
businesses include: supermarkets, convenience stores, grocery stores,
corner markets, and gas stations.36  The MOU provides that only food
service establishments that generate “50 percent or more of its total an-
nual dollar receipts from the sale of food for consumption on the prem-
29 Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restrictions on Sale of Large Sugary
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/nyregion/health-
board-approves-bloombergs-soda-ban.html.
30 David B. Caruso & Jennifer Peltz, NYC Bans Big, Sugary Drinks at Restaurants, YA-
HOO! NEWS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/nyc-bans-big-sugary-drinks-restaurants-
210319871.html.
31 Michael M. Grynbaum, Judge Blocks New York City’s Limits on Big Sugary Drinks,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/nyregion/judge-invalidates-
bloombergs-soda-ban.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The New York State Court of Appeals in
New York’s highest court.  The Court of Appeals hears appeals from the Appellate Divisions
of the Supreme Court, which hear appeals from the New York Supreme Courts, which are trial
courts. See Structure of the Courts, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www
.nycourts.gov/courts/structure.shtml (last updated Feb. 15, 2013).
32 Michael M. Grynbaum, City Argues to Overturn Ruling that Prevented Limits on Sug-
ary Drinks, N. Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/nyregion/
bloomberg-presses-for-reversal-of-court-ban-on-sugary-drink-limits.html?_r=1&.
33 E. C. Gogolak, Appeals Court Rules Against Bloomberg Beverage Restrictions, N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/nyregion/appeals-court-rules-
against-bloomberg-beverage-rules.html?_r=0.
34 Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale of Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-
a-ban-on-large-sugared-drinks.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter New York Plans to Ban
Large Sodas].
35 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12,slip op. 5505 at 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t, July
30, 2013).
36 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP106.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-NOV-13 10:02
194 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:187
ises or ready-to-eat for off-premises consumption” are subject to
inspection by a local Health Department.37  Second, drinks such as alco-
hol, diet soda,38 beverages that contain more than 50% milk, and those to
which customers add sugar themselves are not subject to the Soda Ban.39
Since sixteen fluid ounces is the size of a medium coffee and smaller
than a common soda bottle,40 New York City residents would probably
notice the effects of the Soda Ban after its implementation.  However, the
restriction will not ban people from getting large quantities of sweetened
beverages if they want to.  Rather, the Soda Ban aims to educate the
public by forcing people to make an informed choice of purchasing large
and small soda drinks and consider the amount of sugar and the number
of calories contained in the sugary beverages they consume on a daily
basis.  The Soda Ban’s challengers argued and the New York County
Supreme Court held that the Soda Ban was capricious and arbitrary on
the grounds that the Soda Ban does not include all food establishments
and all sugary drinks.  However, because administrative agencies are
given a high degree of judicial deference when exercising regulatory
power in an area of particular expertise, a party that seeks to invalidate a
regulation has “the heavy burden of showing that the regulation is unrea-
sonable and unsupported by any evidence.”41
This Note’s argument unfolds in three Parts.  Part I examines the
obesity crisis associated with sweetened sugary drinks and briefly dis-
cusses the background that led to New York City’s attempted Soda Ban.
Part II introduces some of the Soda Ban’s constitutional implications and
analyzes critics’ concerns regarding the implementation of a soda tax or
soda ban.  Part III discusses the most salient points regarding tobacco
taxes and food industry regulations and how they relate to the proposed
Soda Ban.  Part III.A addresses how the consumption of soda products
differs from that of tobacco and food.  Part III.B discusses the implica-
tions of tobacco taxes and food regulations for the Soda Ban.  Part III.C
discusses the differences between taxes and bans, argues that the govern-
ment’s direct regulation of the beverage industry is a sound policy, and
explains why the government might prefer to ban soda in limited circum-
stances rather than tax it.  Part III.D briefly explains the anticipated ef-
fects of the Soda Ban.
37 Id. at 6.
38 Id.
39 Caruso & Peltz, supra note 30.
40 New York Plans to Ban Large Sodas, supra note 34.
41 Consolation Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r New York State Dep’tof Health, 85
N.Y.2d 326, 331–32 (1995).
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I. THE IMPETUS FOR NEW YORK CITY’S SODA BAN
A. Health Issues Related to Soda Drinks
New York, like most other states, is experiencing an obesity crisis.42
More than half of the adult New York City population (58%) and nearly
20% of New York City public school students (kindergarten through
eighth grade) are now overweight or obese.43  In 2006, obesity cost the
nation $147 billion in direct medical costs—insurers in New York State
alone spent $11.1 billion in obesity-related medical costs, including $2.7
billion spent by Medicare and $4 billion by Medicaid.44  By 2012, obes-
ity-related medical costs increased to $190 billion for the uninsured, with
annual medical spending for each obese person totaling $3,271, com-
pared to $512 for the non-obese.45  Additional indirect costs include de-
creased productivity, increased insurance premiums, and increased
disability costs.46  Thus, in this context, food choices affect not only the
individual who makes them, but also all taxpayers.
The fact that non-diet sodas contain large amounts of sugar and cal-
ories is uncontested: a regular twelve-ounce cola is 150 calories and con-
tains ten teaspoons of sugar.47  The American Heart Association has
suggested that the maximum amount of sugar intake should be 150 calo-
ries per day (37.5 grams or nine teaspoons) for men and 100 calories per
day (twenty-five grams of six teaspoons) for women,48 meaning that
42 Reversing the Epidemic, supra note 3, at 4.
43 Brief for Appellant at 7, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v.
N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t, July
30, 2013).
44 Reversing the Epidemic, supra note 3, at 5.
45 Rick Ungar, Obesity Now Costs Americans More in HealthCare Spending than Smok-
ing, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/04/30/obesity-now-
costs-americans-more-in-healthcare-costs-than-smoking/.
46 J.G. Trogdon et al., Indirect Costs of Obesity: A Review of the Current Literature, 9
OBESITY REVS. 489, 489 (2008), available at http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.cornell
.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=3258b432-1533-4b72-96a9-a1085be771cb%40session
mgr112&vid=2&hid=103.
47 How Sweet Is It?, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutrition-
source/files/2012/10/how-sweet-is-it-color.pdf (last visited July 13, 2013); MICHAEL F. JACOB-
SON, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, LIQUID CANDY: HOW SOFT DRINKS ARE HARMING
AMERICANS’ HEALTH 4 (2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/liquid_candy_
final_w_new_supplement.pdf.  Diet sodas have also been associated with detrimental effects
on health, such as higher risk of developing type 2 diabetes. See Amanda L. Chan, Diet Soda
Associated with Type 2 Diabetes Risk, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2013, 4:58
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/11/diet-soda-diabetes-risk-type-2-artificially-
sweetened-sugar_n_2663247.html.  Furthermore, studies have shown that artificial sweeteners
used in diet sodas make people hungrier, causing them to particularly crave sugars and carbo-
hydrates. See Dominique Mosbergen, Diet Soda Health Risks: Study Says Artificial Sweeten-
ers May Cause Weight Gain, Deadly Diseases, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2013), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/11/diet-soda-health-risks_n_3581842.html.
48 Gianna Rose, Recommended Daily Allowance of Sugar, LIVESTRONG (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.livestrong.com/article/363283-recommended-daily-allowance-of-sugar.
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drinking a twelve-ounce cola alone could exceed the recommended daily
sugar intake.  While there have been heated debates as to whether soda
consumption directly causes obesity,49 many researchers have found evi-
dence that soft drinks do, in fact, cause obesity.50  Even if there was an
absence of a direct causal link between drinking soda and obesity, an-
other fact suggests that there is at least an indirect link between them.
Unlike calories in solid food, calories consumed in the form of sugary
drinks do not significantly decrease hunger.  Thus, people who drink
non-diet soda tend to consume more calories than people who do not
consume calories in the form of sugary drinks.51
Being overweight or obese increases the risk of diabetes, heart dis-
ease, stroke, cancer, arthritis, asthma, depression and other diseases.52
Moreover, overweight children and adolescents are more likely to be-
come obese adults.53  Obesity may weaken the stability and long-term
growth of the economy54 because people with obesity-related illnesses
need to take a greater number of sick days and tend to retire earlier than
their non-obese counterparts.55  Also, since the public sector finances a
49 See Michael L. Marlow & Alden F. Shiers, Would Soda Taxes Really Yield Health
Benefits?, 33 REGULATION 34, 34–36 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regula
tion/regv33n3/regv33n3-4.pdf.
50 See Caroline M. Apovian, Sugar-Sweetened Soft Drinks, Obesity, and Type 2 Diabe-
tes, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 978, 978–79 (2004) (includes Harvard School of Public Health
study illustrating that soft drinks contribute to obesity in adults.); see also JACOBSON, supra
note 47, at 10–11 (citing two studies: one study finding that obesity rates have risen in tandem
with soft drink consumption and that heavy soda drinkers have higher caloric intakes; and
another study finding that greater consumption of soft drinks by children between the ages of
nine and fourteen is associated with small increases in body mass index (BMI) and that “con-
sumption of sugar-added beverages may contribute to weight gain among adolescents.”).  In-
terestingly, another study found that studies that fail to find a relationship between the
consumption of sugared beverages and negative health outcomes tend to be conducted by
authors funded by the beverage industry. Richard A. Forshee et al., Sugar-Sweetened Bever-
ages and Body Mass Index in Children and Adolescents: A Meta-Analysis, 87 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 1662,1666 (2008).
51 See D. P. DiMeglio & R. D. Mattes, Liquid Versus Solid Carbohydrate: Effects on
Food Intake and Body Weight, 24 INT’L. J. OBESITY 794, 798 (2000) (in a study where subjects
added 450 calories per day to their diets from either soft drinks or jelly beans during two four-
week periods, the subjects subconsciously compensated for the added calories by consuming
roughly 540 fewer calories from other foods when they ate jelly beans, but not when they
drank soft drinks).
52 Reversing the Epidemic, supra note 3, at 4–5; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT
AND OBESITY 8–9 (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/calls/obesity/
CalltoAction.pdf.pdf [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION].
53 Nutrition Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
healthyYouth/nutrition/facts.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2013).
54 See Kathryn Hinton, Note and Commentary, Employer by Name, Insurer by Trade:
Society’s Obesity Epidemic and Its Effects on Employers’ Healthcare Costs, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 137, 141–43 (2006).
55 See generally Glenna Novack, Note, Lawsuits in the Fast-Food Nation: Will Fast-
Food Suits Succeed as Obesity Becomes an American Tradition?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1307,
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substantial part of obesity costs via Medicaid and Medicare, obesity
heavily burdens federal and state budgets.56  It has been noted that the
absence of obesity would decrease the annual medical expenditures by
7–11%.57  Given such findings, reducing the consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages may provide the best opportunity to reduce obesity
and curb the resulting health problems and medical and social costs for
both present and future generations.
Just as it is important to realize the link between soda consumption
and the obesity epidemic, it must also be noted that the American obesity
epidemic has many sources, including: lack of physical exercise;58 poor
diet and unhealthy dieting;59 cultural upbringing;60 health-care profes-
sionals’ failure to counsel patients about obesity;61excessive food por-
tions in restaurants;62 junk food advertising on children’s television
1307 (2006) (arguing that if obesity comes to be seen as an illness, the personal choice to eat
fast food would not bar recovery for fast-food plaintiffs when the restaurants are seen as re-
sponsible for creating disease).  In 2009 and 2010, more than one-third of U.S. adults—35.7%
of U.S. adults, 41 million women and 37 million men—were obese.  Cynthia L. Ogden et al.,
Prevalence of Obesity in the United States, 2009-2010, NCHS DATA BRIEF, NO. 83, 1, 3 (Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics, MD) Jan. 2012, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
databriefs/db82.pdf.  For more statistics on overweight and obesity, see Overweight and Obes-
ity Statistics, WEIGHT-CONTROL INFORMATION NETWORK, http://www.win.niddk.nih.gov/statis-
tics (last modified Mar. 12, 2013).
56 Reversing the Epidemic, supra note 3, at 5.
57 Id.
58 Thomas N. Robinson, Reducing Children’s Television Viewing to Prevent Obesity: A
Randomized Control Trial, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1561, 1561 (1999).
59 See Mary K. Serdula et al., Prevalence of Attempting Weight Loss and Strategies for
Controlling Weight, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1353, 1357–58 (1999) (finding that many dieters
reduce their fat intake without reducing total calories or increasing their amount of exercise).
60 For example, the American cultural models of abundance and innovation affect food
choices at restaurants (e.g., certain American adages, for example “bigger is better,” or “more
is better,” and the American capitalist value of “getting the most for your buck” may en-
courage people to consumer larger portions of food at restaurants). See Peter J. Brown &
Sterling V. Krick, Culture and Economy in the Etiology of Obesity: Diet, Television and the
Illusions of Personal Choice 6, 9, http://www.marial.emory.edu/pdfs/wp003-01obesity%20
.pdf.  Furthermore, the increase in the number of restaurants in the United States by 75%
between 1977 and 1991, coupled with marketing-driven practice of “super-sizing” or value
sizing have resulted in Americans getting an increased proportion of daily energy from food
prepared outside the home. Id. at 8, 9.  According to Nielsen ratings, U.S. children spend more
time watching television than in any other activity except sleep, including time spent in school,
resulting in reduced energy expenditure from displacement of physical activity, and increased
food intake either during viewing or in response to food advertising. Id. at 11.
61 See Deborah A. Galuska et al., Are Health Care Professionals Advising Obese Pa-
tients to Lose Weight?, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1576, 1576–78 (1999) (finding that less than
half of obese adults have been advised to lose weight by their doctors); see also Christina C.
Wee et al., Physician Counseling About Exercise, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N1583, 1583–88
(1999) (finding that doctors infrequently advise patients about exercise).
62 See Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Patterns and Trends in Food Portion
Sizes, 1977-1998, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 450, 450–53 (2003) (finding that food portion sizes
have increased markedly in recent decades).  For example, Cheesecake Factory’s Bistro
Shrimp Pasta dish is 3,120 calories, which is 320 to 520 more calories than the amount advised
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programs;63 the increasing number of meals eaten outside the home;64
and genetic predisposition.65  Certainly the consumption of sugary drinks
is not the sole cause of the problem.  However, since these causes are
closely correlated with each other, controlling one factor may ultimately
influence other factors and promote overall health.  For example, drink-
ing soda amplifies a person’s risk of obesity beyond baseline hereditary
projections.66  Thus, controlling the consumption of soda drinks may be
an important step to bring fundamental and long-lasting improved public
health outcomes.
for a moderately active male aged nineteen to thirty to consume in a day.  Matt Peckham,
Cheesecake Factory’s 3,000-Calorie Bistro Shrimp Pasta Tops List of ‘Xtreme’ Gut-Busters,
TIME (Jan. 17, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/01/17/cheesecake-factorys-3000-calo-
rie-bistro-shrimp-pasta-tops-list-of-xtreme-gut-busters/.
63 See Dale Kunkel et al., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK
FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN 5, 12 (2004), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/fami-
lies/resources/advertising-children.pdf.; see also CSPI Hits Marketing Junk Food to Kids, CTR.
FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Nov. 10, 2003), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200311101.html;
but see Zywicki et al., supra note 12, at 979 (“[T]he available evidence to support any prof-
fered link between food advertising and obesity is quite limited and often contrary to the
thesis.”).
64 Americans spend half of their food budget and consume a third of their calories
outside the home, with fast food constituting 50% of all restaurant sales.  Michael A. McCann,
Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
1161, 1171 (2004).  Americans spend $110 billion annually in the country’s 160,000 fast-food
restaurants, and get 37% of their daily calories from eating a fast-food meal.  Fast Food Statis-
tics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.statisticbrain.com/fast-food-statistics.
65 See Joseph P. McMenamin & Andrea D. Tiglio, Not the Next Tobacco: Defense to
Obesity Claims, 61 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 445, 453–86 (2006) (presenting a comprehensive
explanation of the causes of obesity); see also SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION, supra
note 52, at 1 (“Overweight and obesity are caused by many factors.  For each individual, body
weight is determined by a combination of genetic, metabolic, behavioral, environmental, cul-
tural, and socioeconomic influences.”); see generally Zywicki et al., supra note 12, at 980–90
(presenting numerous hypotheses regarding the causes of increased rates of obesity among
Americans).  The genetic association with obesity is more pronounced with greater intake of
sugar-sweetened beverages. See Qibin Qi et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Genetic Risk
of Obesity, 367 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1387, 1387 (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www
.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa1203039.  A study found that active people with a genetic
predisposition to obesity did not have higher or lower BMIs than those of people without the
obesity gene. See Genes Are Not Destiny, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard
.edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesity-causes/genes-and-obesity (last visited Oct, 17, 2013).
Furthermore, even a study that found that gaining weight from a high-fat diet is primarily
determined by genetics admitted that “whether you choose to eat a high-fat diet in the first
place is largely environmental.”  Kathleen Miles, ‘Fat Genes’ Determine Obesity UCLA Study
Says, In Addition to Diet and Exercise, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2013/01/10/fat-genes-obesity-ucla-study-diet-exercise_n_2450108.html.
66 Marilynn Marchione, Soda, Other Sugary Drinks More Firmly Tied to Obesity In New
Studies, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/21/obesi
ty-soda-sugary-drinks_n_1904732.html.
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B. Early Governmental Efforts to Curb Soda Consumption
New York City’s attempt to ban large sized sodas from being sold
by certain retailers is not the first type of regulatory measure to try to
limit soda consumption.  Many states and localities enacted soda taxes
from the 1960s to the 1980s, mostly in the range of $0.01 to $0.02 per
bottle (approximately 1–3%), but repealed them in the 1990s.67  As one
might expect, lobbying by the beverage and bottling industries was the
most common reason for repealing those soda taxes.68  The lobbying
power of soda companies cannot be overlooked, since most of them, in-
cluding PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, and Dr. Pepper Snapple Group are multina-
tional companies listed in the Fortune 500.69  This pattern was apparent
in the failure of New York Governor David A. Paterson’s proposed tax
on sugary drinks.  Kevin Finnegan, the political director of 1199 Service
Employees International Union (a local union of the Service Employees
International Union, set up to organize pharmacists in New York City),
explained that “money” was the reason for the defeat.  Estimates of
money spent by the Alliance for a Healthier New York ranged from $2.5
million to $5 million, whereas the American Beverage Association spent
$9.4 million to oppose New York’s soda tax.70
While the differences between banning and taxing soda drinks will
be discussed in detail in Part III, at this point, it is worth discussing the
process of implementing either a soda ban or a soda tax policy in New
York City.  In the case of a ban, the proposal can be approved by the
Board of Health, whose members are appointed by New York City’s
mayor.71  In contrast, for New York City to impose taxes or change its
existing tax structure, it must first seek permission from the New York
State Legislature.72  This is where lobbying comes into play.  Thus, be-
cause of such limited tax authority, implementation of tax-based policies
have proven to be infeasible in many cases, including New York State’s
failure to tax soda drinks in 2009.
67 Brownell et al., supra note 19, 1602 (taxes can be levied at the wholesale or retail
level, and fixed by volume of product or as a percentage of sales price).
68 Id.
69 Fortune 500, FORTUNE (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/for
tune500/2012/full_list.  In some cases, there is an explicit quid pro quo involving the industry.
For example, in response to Coca-Cola’s offer to build a bottling plant in Louisiana, the state
passed a law in 1993 repealing its soft drink tax contingent on a bottling company contracting
to build a bottling plant in the state worth $50 million or more.  As Coca-Cola signed such a
contract in 1997, the tax was abolished. See Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 18, at 855–56.
70 Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an Antitax
Message, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/nyregion/03sodatax
.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0.
71 Soda Makers Push Against New York Ban, supra note 14.
72 Erin Adele Scharff, Note, Taxes as Regulatory Tools: An Argument for Expanding
New York City’s Taxing Authority, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1556, 1556 (2011).
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II. THE REACTION TO THE SODA BAN
A. Constitutional Implications of the Soda Ban
1. Separation of Powers
The promulgation of New York City’s Soda Ban garnered public
criticism from people who view the ban as paternalistic.73  The lawsuit
filed by the American soft drink industry and other businesses to over-
turn the Soda Ban questioned the authority of the New York City Board
of Health to enact such policy.74  The lawsuit also raised constitutional
concerns.  The main issues in N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Cham-
bers of Commerce v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene
were: (1) whether the New York City Board of Health violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine by promulgating the Soda Ban; and (2) whether
the Soda Ban was arbitrary and capricious.75  Both the trial and appellate
courts that heard the case held that the Soda Ban was unconstitutional
based on state law because it violated separation of powers principles.
The New York County Supreme Court further held that the ban was arbi-
trary and capricious, and thus contrary to law.76  In reaching their separa-
tion of powers conclusion, the two courts applied the four-prong test of
Boreali v. Axelrod, the seminal New York State separation of powers
case.77  In Boreali, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Public
Health Council (PHC) overstepped the bounds of its authority in institut-
ing regulations banning indoor smoking in certain establishments.78  The
four factors the Boreali court looked at in making its determination were:
73 Bettina Elias Siegel, Bloomberg vs. Big Soda: Portion Size, Paternalism and Politics,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bettina-elias-siegel/nyc-
mike-bloomberg-soda-ban_b_1560967.html.
74 Michael M. Grynbaum, Soda Industry Sues to Stop a Sales Ban on Big Drinks, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/nyregion/soda-industry-sues-to-
stop-bloombergs-sales-limits.html?_r=0.
75 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N. Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12, slip op. 30609(U) at 2, 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 11,
2013).
76 Id. at 31, 34.  However, note that the Appellate Division held that the fourth factor of
the Boreali test was violated, in contrast to the lower court. Id. at 31–32; N.Y. Statewide Coal.
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No.
653584-12, slip op. 5505, at 28-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t, July 30, 2013).  Furthermore,
the Appellate Division did not reach the issue of whether the Soda Ban was arbitrary and
capricious, reasoning that the Ban’s failure to meet the Boreali test ended the inquiry. See
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12, slip op. 5505 at 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t, July 30,
2013).
77 71 N.Y.2d 1 (1987).
78 Id. at 6.  The four “coalescing circumstances” that were present in Boreali were: (1)
the PHC had carved out numerous exemptions based solely upon economic and social consid-
erations; (2) the PHC “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules
without the benefit of legislative guidance”; (3) the State Legislature had previously adopted
legislation relating to smoking in public places, and thereafter considered (but never adopted)
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(1) whether the challenged regulation was based upon concerns not re-
lated to the stated purpose of the regulation (e.g. economic and social
concerns); (2) whether the regulation was created on a clean slate,
thereby creating its own comprehensive set of results without legislative
guidance; (3) whether the regulation addressed a matter the legislature
had previously discussed, debated or tried to address (presence of this
factor is construed as being indicative of the legislature’s inability to
agree on “the goals and methods that should govern in resolving” the
issue); and (4) whether the regulation required the exercise of expertise
or technical competence on behalf of the body passing the legislation.79
The four Borealis factors function to frame judicial analysis of whether
regulatory action exceeds the authority of an administrative body by sup-
planting the constitutionally-allocated exclusive legislative authority of
the State Legislature.
In utilizing the four-factor Boreali test to determine the constitution-
ality of the Soda Ban, the New York County and appellate courts first
determined that the act of the New York City Health Board was within
the scope of Boreali review and that a sufficient number of Boreali test
factors were present (i.e., the Supreme Court of New York County found
that the ban violated three factors and the Appellate Division of the Su-
preme Court of New York found that the ban violated four factors).80
The Appellate Division held that the Board’s decision to exempt certain
establishments and drinks “reflects a balance between health concerns,
an individual consumers choice of diet, and business financial interest”
and thus involves “difficult social problems,” which must be resolved by
a legislature.81  The Appellate Division also held that the Soda Ban vio-
lated the second Boreali factor—whether the agency exceeded its author-
ity by going outside the limits of interstitial rulemaking (the process of
filling in the details of a broad legislative mandate).82  The court rea-
soned that neither the New York State Legislature nor the New York
City Council had established a statute defining a policy with respect to
excessive soda consumption, and that the New York City Charter’s grant
40 bills that addressed the same subject area; and (4) no special expertise in the field of health
was necessary to develop the regulations. Id. at 11–14.
79 Id. at 12–14.
80 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12,slip op. 5505 at 17–31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t,
July 30, 2013);  N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N. Y. City Dept.
of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, slip op. 30609(U) at 15,19, 31-32 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Mar. 11, 2013).
81 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12,slip op. 5505 at 21–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t,
July 30, 2013).
82 Id. at 23.
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of broad authority to the Board of Health is not unlimited.83  Although
the court acknowledged that the New York Legislature intended to pro-
vide the Board with the discretion to engage in interstitial rulemaking
regarding matters inherently harmful to the health of City residents, stat-
ing that because overconsumption of soda, not mere soda consumption,
is what poses a health hazard, the court found that the Soda Ban violated
the second Boreali factor.84  In finding that the Soda Ban violated the
third factor, the court noted that the Soda Ban employs different means
of targeting the sale of certain sugary beverages than those previously
employed by legislative bodies.  Nevertheless, the court reasoned, be-
cause the legislature had not agreed on “the goals and methods that
should govern in resolving” the issue addressed by the Soda Ban, the
agency improperly attempted to come up with its own solution.85  Fi-
nally, the court held that the Board violated the fourth factor because it
did not exercise any special expertise or technical competence in devel-
oping the Soda Ban.86  The court based this conclusion on the fact that
the deleterious effect of excessive soda consumption is well known to
non-experts and the Board had enacted the rule without substantively
modifying the draft version of the rule proposed by the Office of the
Mayor.87
83 Id. at 24–25.
84 Id. at 25–27.  Although moderate soda consumption may not be a health hazard, it
must be noted that obesity has been officially recognized as a disease by the American Medi-
cal Association. See Pollack, supra note 8.
85 Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (1987); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Cham-
bers of Commerce, slip op. 5505 at 27–29.
86 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, slip op. 5505 at 28, 30–31.
87 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, slip op. 5505 at 30–31.
However, the lower court held that the ban did not violate the fourth Boreali factor because the
mere fact that the Board enacted the version of the regulation proposed by the Office of the
Mayor without significant modification did not necessarily indicate that the Board had not
employed its technical expertise to evaluate the regulation. Id. Board membership does in-
deed require technical expertise.  Of the ten Board of Health members not serving as chairper-
son, five must be doctors of medicine, and non-physician members must hold at least a masters
in “environmental, biological, veterinary, physical or behavioral health or science, or rehabili-
tative science or in a related field.”  NYC Charter § 553(a) (2001).  Furthermore, all ten Board
members must have at least ten years of pertinent experience.  Id.  As the Board noted in its
brief for the appeal:
The current members of the Board represent a broad range of health and medical
disciplines, including: a former chairperson of the Department of Community Health
Sciences at the Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine;
the president and CEO of Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn; an Associate
Professor of Pediatrics and Community and Preventive Medicine at Mt. Sinai School
of Medicine; a Professor and Chair at the Department of Epidemiology at Columbia
University Mailman School of Public Health; a Professor and Director of the Urban
Public Health Program at Hunter College; and a Senior Advisor at Nexera Consult-
ing and former Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, the fed-
eral agency responsible for Medicare, Medicaid, and related programs.
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As to the question of arbitrary and capricious standard, through Ar-
ticle 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, a party may
challenge determinations or rulings of administrative agencies, public
bodies or officers.  Such an Article 78 challenge submits agency action
to a two prong test.88  The two-step process examines first whether the
action is reasonable and second, whether the action is arbitrary and capri-
cious.89  Finding all four Boreali factors to be present in the Board’s
action to promulgate the Soda Ban, the Appellate Division did not reach
the second prong.90  For its part, the New York County Supreme Court
did conduct the two-prong analysis, reaching the second prong of the test
after concluding that the Board’s stated premise of enacting the Soda
Ban to address the rising obesity rate in the New York City was reasona-
ble.  In its second prong analysis, the court held that the rule’s exemp-
tions of various food establishments and beverages were arbitrary and
capricious, and undermined the stated purpose of the rule.91
Although the two courts’ rulings put the Soda Ban on hold, Mayor
Bloomberg appealed to New York State’s highest court—the Court of
Appeals—which announced on October 17, 2013, that it will hear the
appeal.92  The fate of the appeal, however, will depend on the adminis-
tration of Bloomberg’s successor as mayor, as the Court of Appeals will
not hear the case until 2014, after Mayor Bloomberg is out of office.  The
outcome of the appeal will be the ultimate decision regarding the Soda
Ban proposed by Bloomberg, but even if the Court of Appeals affirms
the suspension, a soda ban may yet go into effect with some modifica-
tions to the rule and its implementation.  The decision of the Appellate
Division noted:
[N]othing in this decision is intended to circumscribe
DOHMH’s legitimate power.  Nor is this decision in-
tended to express an opinion on the wisdom of the soda
consumption restrictions . . . .  [H]ealth authorities may
Brief for Petitioner, 46, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.
City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
88 CPLR 7803; N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N. Y. City
Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, slip op. 30609(U) at 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Mar. 11, 2013).
89 See, e.g., Consolidation Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r New York State Dept. of
Health, 85 N.Y.2d 326, 331 (1995); Bates v Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 460, 464 (1978); Bernstein v
Toia, 43 NY2d 437, 448 (1977); Ostrer v Schenck, 41 N.Y.2d 782, 786 (1977).
90 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N. Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, slip op. 30609(U) at 33–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar.
11, 2013).
91 Id. at 34.
92 Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Soda Ban to Go Before State’s Top Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/nyregion/new-york-soda-ban-to-
go-before-states-top-court.html.
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make rules and regulations for the protection of the pub-
lic health and have great latitude and discretion in per-
forming their duty to safeguard the public health.93
Contrary to the holdings of the two New York courts, this Note
concludes that consideration of the four Boreali factors should not invali-
date New York City’s Soda Ban for the following reasons.  First, the
exceptions to the Soda Ban are not a result of balancing the economic
and social concerns against health concerns as were the exceptions to the
regulations at issue in Boreali.  The challenged regulation in Boreali ex-
cluded venues with seating “capacities of less than 50, conventions, trade
shows, bars, private homes, private automobiles, private social functions,
hotel and motel rooms and retail tobacco stores,” and more importantly,
a wavier could be obtained from the Commission upon a showing of
“financial hardship.”94  In contrast, which food establishments were to be
exempt from the Soda Ban was not defined in the challenged Ban itself,
but rather based on an MOU previously signed in 2010 between the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the New York
State’s Department of Agriculture and Marketing, and there were no ex-
ceptions based on “financial hardship”.  Furthermore, unlike the excep-
tions to the regulations at issue in Boreali, this MOU was not created
particularly for the Soda Ban, and the MOU’s criterion that only food
service establishments that generate fifty percent or more of their total
annual dollar receipts from the sale of food for ready-to-eat consumption
(either on or off-premises) are subject to inspection by a local Health
Department is distinct from exempting places with capacities of less than
fifty, as the latter is an exception based on economically adverse effects
on small businesses, whereas the former is not.  Also, the drinks desig-
nated exempt from the Ban were determined solely on health concerns
rather than on any other economic or social concerns.  While the scien-
tific basis of the Soda Ban exceptions, like the exceptions at issue in
Boreali, may not reach the level of the regulation upheld by the New
York Court of Appeals in Chiropractic Ass’n of N.Y., Inc.v v. Hilleboe,95
that by itself does not mean that the Soda Ban exceptions are analogous
93 Id. at 31–32.
94 Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 7 (1987).
95 Chiropractic Ass’n of N.Y., Inc. v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109 (1962) (upholding a chal-
lenged regulation that limited the use of x-rays by chiropractors who were not licensed to
practice medicine); Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d at 12–13 (distinguishing the exceptions in
Boreali for bars, convention centers, small restaurants, and the like, and the waivers based on
financial hardship, which allegedly lacked considerations of public health, from the regulations
challenged in Chiropractic Assn. limiting the use of x-rays and fluoroscopic equipment by
people not licensed to practice medicine, stating that the latter regulations were “promulgated
in direct furtherance of the health-related goal of avoiding unnecessary exposure to harmful
radiation”).
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with the Boreali exceptions.  The scientific basis for the venues that are
exempt from the Soda Ban is more analogous to the regulation upheld by
Hilleboe than the regulation struck down by Boreali, and the exemptions
from the Soda Ban are not based on financial hardships as they were in
Boreali.
Second, while the Appellate Division’s ruling on the Soda Ban re-
lies on Boreali’s interpretation of the New York Public Health Law
§ 225(5)(a) to analogously interpret New York City Charter §§ 556 and
55896 to reason that the agency had created a regulation on a legislative
clean slate, other binding precedent has endorsed a more flexible ap-
proach.  As the New York Court of Appeals had previously noted on
New York Public Health Law § 225,
[n]ecessity . . . fixes a point beyond which it is unreason-
able and impracticable to compel the Legislature to pre-
scribe detailed rules.  Although an enactment entitled a
health law or regulation must be such in fact as well as
in name, and must not attempt in the name of the police
power to effect a purpose having no adequate connection
with the common good, the Sanitary Code in general
presents a situation where flexibility and the adaptation
of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions
constitute the essence of the program.97
Thus, the courts considering the Soda Ban could easily have taken a
broader approach in interpreting New York City Charter §§ 556 and 558.
The Soda Ban reflected a regulatory response to a health problem that
should have been assessed within the context of such necessary regula-
tory flexibility.
96 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(a) (McKinney 2011), available at http://www
.health.ny.gov/regulations/public_health_law/section/225 (“The sanitary code may: (a) deal
with any matters affecting the security of life or health or the preservation and improvement of
public health in the state of New York, and with any matters as to which the jurisdiction is
conferred upon the public health council”);  N.Y. City Charter § 556 (“Except as otherwise
provided by law, the department shall have jurisdiction to regulate all matters affecting health
in the city of New York and to perform all those functions and operations performed by the
city that relate to the health of the people of the city, including but not limited to the mental
health, mental retardation, alcoholism and substance abuse-related needs of the people of the
city.”); N.Y. City Charter § 558(b), available at http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/NYC/22/
558 (“The board of health from time to time may add to and alter, amend or repeal any part of
the health code, and may therein publish additional provisions for security of life and health in
the city and confer additional power on the department not inconsistent with the constitution,
law of this state or this charter, and may provide for the enforcement of the health code of any
order made by the commissioner or the board of health, by such fines, penalties, forfeitures
and imprisonment as may be prescribed there in or therein or otherwise by law.”).
97 Chiropractic Ass’n of N.Y., Inc., 12 N.Y.2d at 120.
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Third, while the New York City Council and the State Legislature
considered three soda-related resolutions (taxing soda drinks, requiring
warning labels, and prohibiting the use of food stamps to purchase such
drinks) but failed to implement any of them, “the Court of Appeals, in
Boreali, could not have intended to invalidate a regulation merely be-
cause the Legislature had, at some point, considered the same subject
matter.”98
Lastly, the Soda Ban not only addresses subject matter highly ap-
propriate to the expertise of the Board of Health, but required the
Board’s expertise in public health to determine that sugary drinks were a
significant driver of the obesity epidemic, as well as the link between
portion size and consumption.  As required by the City Charter, all of the
members of the Board at the time of the promulgation of the Soda Ban
had ten years of experience in fields of medical or scientific expertise—
Board members included a former chairperson of the Department of
Community Health Sciences at the Tulane University School of Public
Health and Tropical Medicine, the president and CEO of Maimonides
Medical Center in Brooklyn, a Professor and Chair at the Department of
Epidemiology at Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health,
and a Senior Advisor at Nexera Consulting and former Administrator of
the Health Care Financing Administration, the federal agency responsi-
ble for Medicare, Medicaid, and related programs.99  Although the mem-
bers of the Board did not modify the Mayor’s proposed version of the
Ban, the fact that they reviewed and analyzed the scientific arguments
made by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
and those opposing the Ban is sufficient to show that their specialized
skills were involved.
2. Substantive Due Process
While the Soda Ban’s paternalism might conceivably trigger sub-
stantive due process concerns, no such argument was raised in the Soda
Ban challenge lawsuit.  As I explain below, it is highly unlikely that such
and argument would be successful because the Soda Ban promotes vari-
ous compelling governmental interests and is narrowly tailored.
98 Festa v. Leshen, 145 A.D.2d 49, 51, 63 (1989) (holding that the New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal’s (DHCR) amendments to the Rent Stabiliza-
tion Code was a proper exercise of the DHCR’s statutory authority.  In analyzing the second
Boreali factor, the court held that although the Code’s succession regulations were not specifi-
cally addressed by the Legislature or the City Council, they were “entirely consistent with the
legislative intent underlying the Rent Stabilization Law.”).
99 Brief for Petitioner, 46, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v.
N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
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The Soda Ban raises the issue of the legitimacy of the government’s
authority to regulate what people should eat.100  The Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution forbids states from depriving any
individual of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”101
In determining whether a law violates substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a reviewing court must first determine whether
the liberty interest at issue is a fundamental right.102  In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that the right to physician-assisted
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest, and thus was not protected
by the Due Process Clause.103  In reaching its decision, the Court derived
a two part test for whether a fundamental right exists for the purposes of
substantive due process analysis.  First, the Due Process Clause protects
fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted in history and tradition” and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”104  Second, the fundamental
right must be carefully described.105  If a fundamental right is deprived
by a law or regulation, a court must apply strict scrutiny in assessing the
law’s validity.  Subject to strict scrutiny, a law is upheld only if it is
“justified by a compelling governmental interest,” is “necessary . . . to
the accomplishment of [that] legitimate purpose,”106 and “the means cho-
sen to accomplish the State’s asserted purpose [is] specifically and nar-
rowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”107  Under strict scrutiny
review, the government has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the
law at issue is necessary to achieve the asserted compelling interest.108
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated what constitutes a “com-
pelling” government interest, but has acknowledged that a state or mu-
nicipality may interfere with citizens’ fundamental rights if such
100 This Note does not discuss the dormant Commerce Clause and First Amendment is-
sues, since, unlike other blanket ban policies, New York City’s Soda Ban is highly unlikely to
unduly burden interstate commerce or freedom absent justification by substantial local govern-
mental interests.  Furthermore, banning large soda drinks regulates companies’ business con-
duct, as opposed to their speech.  As the Supreme Court noted in Sorrell v. IMS Health, the
First Amendment does not preclude regulations governing conduct or commerce that merely
inflict incidental burdens on speech. See 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664–65 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that a mother’s right to get an
abortion in limited circumstances is a fundamental right derived from the penumbra of consti-
tutional concern for personal autonomy).
103 Wash. V. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).
104 Id. at 720-21.
105 Id. at 721.
106 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Wygant v. Jacobson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
108 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919–21 (1995); Rich. v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1989).
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interferences are necessary to protect their “health, safety, and general
welfare.”109
On the other hand, if a court deems that the government’s asserted
interest is not a fundamental right, it applies a more flexible standard—
rational basis review.  Under rational basis review, “a legislative classifi-
cation may be upheld only if it bears a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose.”110  Also, the party challenging the legality of the
law holds the burden of proof.111  Thus, as long as a court believes that
the government sought to achieve a legitimate purpose through reasona-
ble means, it will uphold the law at issue as constitutional.112  Applying
Glucksberg’s standard for identifying fundamental rights for the purpose
of substantive due process analysis, an asserted right to purchase a six-
teen-ounce or a larger soda drink at places regulated by the New York
Health Board would probably not be considered a fundamental right.
Such a right is almost certainly too frivolous and novel as to be consid-
ered a fundamental right.  Such a right might be treated analogously to
cases of an asserted right to smoke.  There is “no current court decision
holding that smoking falls within a state constitution’s fundamental right
to privacy,” and several courts in fact have “specifically ruled that smok-
ing does not fall under a federal and/or state constitutional right to pri-
vacy—even where smoking in private is concerned.”113
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that state or municipal
laws enacted to ensure the health, safety, and general welfare of its con-
stituents do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.114  Aiming to pro-
mote public health by reducing obesity, the Soda Ban advances two
compelling interests.  First, the Soda Ban will protect people’s health and
well-being by making unhealthy, sugary beverages less enticing.115  As
the government has a compelling interest to protect public health, it
could reasonably follow that such an interest extends to preventing peo-
ple from becoming obese—especially considering that obesity has been
officially recognized as a disease by the American Medical Associa-
109 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (determining that the compulsory
education law was not justified by a compelling interest because it was not necessary to protect
the health and welfare of children).
110 R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980); see e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
111 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973).
112 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728–32 (1997).
113 Samantha K. Graff, There is No Constitutional Right to Smoke: 2008, http://public
healthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-syn-constitution-2008_0.pdf (citing cases
from Oklahoma, Florida and Ohio).
114 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the private sphere
of family life is not immune from governmental regulation in the furtherance of public
interest).
115 Reversing the Epidemic, supra note 3, at 14.
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tion.116  Furthermore, although a court has never formally determined
that preventing obesity constitutes a compelling government interest, a
comparison can be made with the Supreme Court’s view that the govern-
ment has the right to regulate people’s use of tobacco products.117  In
light of continually increasing rates of obesity and other diet-related ill-
nesses and the way that beverage manufacturers encourage consumption
of unhealthy beverages through aggressive advertising, the government’s
involvement in promoting healthy food choices is both pressing and
necessary.118
Second, New York City has an interest in efficiently managing
funds related to treating diet-related illnesses and promoting general pub-
lic health.  The City can do this by raising funds for health programs and
curbing the rising healthcare expenses incurred by diet-related illnesses
that impose economic burdens on taxpayers.  As the Supreme Court de-
cided in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the government has a compelling
interest in regulating matters that have economically adverse impacts on
its citizens.119  Obesity is a substantial concern for states and municipali-
ties because its economic costs are recurrent and ongoing.  With $168
billion spent annually on obesity-related illnesses—over 16% of the na-
tion’s healthcare expenses—the direct and indirect effects of obesity are
financially burdensome and widespread.  While there may be no bright
line as to at what point obesity becomes a compelling interest, consider-
ing the enormous number of obese people and the amount of money be-
ing spent to ameliorate the obesity epidemic, obesity is something that
deserves our significant interest.
In addition to advancing compelling government interests, the Soda
Ban is narrowly tailored and would survive strict scrutiny.  The Soda
Ban would be implemented on a local level and apply only to New York
City.  Since the size of the obese population is different among cities
even within a single state, local restrictions should be considered nar-
rowly tailored.  Also, the Soda Ban would only restrict the sale of certain
sugary drinks sold in containers over sixteen ounces.  Thus, sugary
drinks sold in containers that are less than or equal to sixteen ounces,
116 See  Pollack, supra note 8.
117 For example, the Supreme Court rejected a tobacco industry challenge to the Family
Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, a 2009 federal law that required graphic warning
labels on cigarettes and restricted marketing of tobacco. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, Am. Snuff Co. v . U.S., 133 S. Ct.
1996 (2013).
118 See discussion supra Parts I.A and I.B. (detailing why diet-related regulations, like the
Soda Ban, may be needed).
119 See 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (allowing Washington State to enact a law regulating
minimum wage on the grounds that it advances a compelling state interest by not only prevent-
ing the unlawful exploitation of workers, but also protecting taxpayers from bearing the burden
of paying the workers’ lost wages).
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drinks that are not sugary, or drinks to which people add sugar them-
selves will be exempt from the Soda Ban.120  Since regulations do not
limit vendors in how much sugar they can provide to consumers on the
side, consumers still have the choice of adding as much as sugar as they
want to drinks that are not pre-sweetened.  This aspect once again illus-
trates that the proposed Soda Ban would not unduly infringe on people’s
freedom.  Furthermore, since the Soda Ban specifically lists the places
where the regulation will be imposed, people would still be able to
purchase sugary drinks that are over sixteen ounces at various places,
such as convenient stores and supermarkets,121 which are not regulated
by the New York City Health Department.122  As previously mentioned,
these various establishments would be exempt from the Soda Ban be-
cause of the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)
and New York State’s Department of Agriculture and Marketing.  Con-
sequently, the Soda Ban would not be overly burdensome and would
arguably provide the least restrictive way to help people select reasona-
bly-sized sugary drinks.  While a more comprehensive Soda Ban may go
farther toward accomplishing its public health goals, the fact that some
places are exempt from the Soda Ban would probably not undermine the
purpose or the proposed effect of the ban.  Since New York City’s Soda
Ban is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose of a “compelling
governmental interest,” and the means is “narrowly framed to accom-
plish that purpose,” it would likely survive strict scrutiny.  Specifically,
the government has compelling interest to solve the problem of the all-
time high obesity rates and the medical costs resulting from the obesity
epidemic, and these rates and costs can be reduced by encouraging peo-
ple to reduce their daily caloric consumption, which in large part is influ-
enced by soda consumption.  Thus, the Ban would also pass the lower
burden of proof threshold required by rational basis review, which re-
quires legislative action to have a “rational relationship to a legitimate
purpose,” and would not be ruled to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.
B. Arguments Against Soda Taxes and the Soda Ban
Like the failed 2009 New York State soda tax, the City Soda Ban
was unwelcome to some members of the public.123  For example, a Quin-
120 See discussion supra Introduction (explaining the scope of the Soda Ban).
121 Id.
122 Guide to New York Soda Ban, supra note 14.
123 Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, Most New Yorkers Oppose Bloomberg’s
Soda Ban: 60% in City Oppose Bloomberg’s Soda Ban, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/nyregion/most-new-yorkers-oppose-bloombergs-
soda-ban.html.
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nipiac University poll released in March 2013 found that 51% of New
Yorkers surveyed opposed the Soda Ban.124  A Harris Interactive/Health
Day poll released in April 2013 showed that respondents were “opposed
to government taxes on sugary drinks and candy by a more than 2-to-1
margin.”125  Although those polls may illustrate some people’s reluc-
tance to increase regulation of sugary products the results likely do not
accurately reflect the opinion of the general public.  For example, a poll
labeling a soda tax as an “obesity” or “fat” tax received 31% support,126
whereas a poll labeling it as a “soft drink” tax rendered 52% support.127
While the variance in wording of the polls relating to the Soda Ban is not
as complicated as that of taxing, and thus may not tap into the same
issues of stigma or discomfort, it is worth noting that public support var-
ies significantly depending on how poll questions are phrased.128  The
difference in poll responses may be due to the nuances of the terms that
are used—the term “fat tax” seems to imply that the tax serves to punish
those who are overweight, whereas “soft drink tax” seems more compa-
rable to the taxes applied to alcohol and cigarettes.  Thus, people may
have reacted more emotionally to the former phrasing simply because the
tax seemed to be a personal attack on the overweight.  However, even if
the public opinion is accurately reflected in the poll results, public opin-
ion is fickle and can change over time.  Thus, a poll result showing
strong opposition or strong support for a Soda Ban today does not neces-
sarily mean that public opinion will not change in the future.  Thus, these
polls should be given minimal weight and the government should princi-
pally rely on objective data, such as obesity-related illness rates and the
associated medical costs.  Furthermore, a former Supreme Court Justice,
Justice Marshall mentioned in Furman v. Georgia, that public polls
should only be given weight when the poll reflects people’s opinion “in
light of all information presently available.”129  Notwithstanding the ac-
curacy of public opinion polls, addressing the possible arguments against
the Soda Ban is the first step to grasping the core of the policy.
124 John Mariani, New York City Voters Divided on Sugary Soda Ban, Survey Says, POST-
STANDARD (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/03/new_york_city_
voters_divided_on_sugary_soda_ban_survey_says.html.
125 Amy Norton, Most American Oppose Soda, Candy Taxes, MYFOXNY.COM (Apr. 25,
2013), http://www.myfoxny.com/story/22075714/most-americans-oppose-soda-candy-taxes.
126 QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLLING INST., PUBLIC OPINION POLL CONDUCTED DECEM-
BER 2008, http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/search-releases/
search-results/release-detail?ReleaseID=1245&What=&strArea=;&strTime=28 (accessed
Sept. 18, 2013).
127 Soft Drink Taxes: A Policy Brief, RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, RUDD
REPORT 4 (Fall 2009), http://eatbettermovemore.org/SA/enact/neighborhood/documents/com
munity.foodmarketing.tools.phlp.rudd_softdrink_tax.pdf.
128 Id.
129 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP106.txt unknown Seq: 26 19-NOV-13 10:02
212 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:187
There are at least three policy arguments against the Soda Ban:
First, that the ban, similar to a tax, might regressively target low- and
middle-income families;130 second, that the ban restricts individuals’
freedom of choice; and finally, that the ban arbitrarily subjects some
businesses to the tax while exempting others.
The first argument contends that a soda tax may disproportionately
affect low-income people, because sugar-sweetened beverages represent
a larger share of spending for the poor than for the overall population.131
But because the poor may be exposed to higher risk of diet-related dis-
ease, these groups may stand to reap the greatest health benefits from
such a tax.  According to scholars at the Oxford University Department
of Public Health looking at health-related food taxes around the world,
“progressive health gains are expected because poor people consume less
healthy food and have a higher incidence of most diet-related disease,
notably cardiovascular disease.”132  Because poor people are more sensi-
tive to price changes, their diet could improve the most as consequence
of a soda tax.133  An analogous benign effect for the poor would likely
result from the Soda Ban.  Moreover, unlike taxing, which causes people
to pay more for a product, because banning does not involve extra pay-
ment but rather simply makes certain products unavailable, a soda ban
will not have a regressive impact.
Regarding the freedom of choice argument, this Part limits its dis-
cussion to non-constitutional issues as Part II, infra of this Note discusses
the constitutional implications of the Soda Ban.  Some soda tax oppo-
nents claim that, because there are roughly 40,000 food products in a
typical U.S. supermarket, the argument that consumers drink too much
soda as a result of inadequate access to healthier food and beverage is
meritless.134  However, most places, including movie theaters, sports sta-
diums, and vending machines, provide a very limited range of drinks,
most of which are sugary.  Furthermore, this argument is also undercut
by the fact that 23.5 million people in the United States live in “food
130 Soda Makers Push Against New York Ban, supra note 14.
131 McGranahan & Schanzenbach, supra note 27 (noting that the average consumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages, as a share of total spending, falls as educational and wealth attain-
ment increases).
132 Denis Campbell, ‘Fat tax’ on Unhealthy Food Must Raise Prices by 20% to Have
Effect, Says Study, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/may/
16/fat-tax-unhealthy-food-effect.
133 See Mytton OT et. al., Taxing Unhealthy Food and Drinks to Improve Health, 344
BRITISH MED. J., 30, 31 (2012) available at http://www.bmj.com/highwire/filestream/584815/
field_highwire_article_pdf/0/bmj.e2931. .
134 Michael L. Marlow & Alden F. Shiers, Would Soda Taxes Really Yield Health Bene-
fits?, 33 REGULATION 34, 35 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regv33n3/regv33n3-4.pdf.
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deserts”—low-income communities with low-access to fresh, healthy,
and affordable food.135
In the lawsuit against the New York City Board of Health challeng-
ing the Soda Ban, the trial court held that the ban was arbitrary and capri-
cious because not all soda vendors are subject to the rule.136  However,
the fact that the ban is allegedly “underinclusive” is not a proper basis for
invalidation.137  As the Board argued on appeal, “patterns ‘of human be-
havior indicate that consumers overwhelmingly gravitate towards the de-
fault option’ and that with the adoption of the ban consumer’s ‘intent
upon consuming more than 16 ounces would have to make conscious
decisions to do so.’”138  Because people can still choose to buy large
soda drinks from supermarkets and restaurants, those who, for example,
want to buy larger sodas to save money, share with family members, or
drink the same soda all day139 can still get the same product for the same
price, unaffected by the ban.  Although the Soda Ban would inconve-
nience some people who want to buy large sodas from certain regulated
businesses, the inconvenience is offset by the importance of protecting
public health.  Furthermore, while consuming solid food also involves
caloric intake, curbing soda consumption is a more effective mechanism
for reducing caloric intake than curbing food consumption.140
135 Food Deserts, USDA, http://apps.ams.usda.gov/fooddeserts/foodDeserts.aspx (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
136 N. Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N. Y. City Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12, slip op. 30609(U) at 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11,
2013).
137 See New York State Health Facilitates Ass’n v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 350
(1991) (upholding the validity of the Public Health Council’s adoption of Medicaid Patient
Access Regulations, which required new applicant facilities seeking nursing home approval to
agree that the home admit a reasonable percentage of Medicaid patients, but not for existing
facilities); see also New York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health, 556
F.3d 114, 133 n.22 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Su-
preme Court in rejecting New York State Restaurant Association’s challenge to disclosure
requirements that affected only ten percent of New York City restaurants, based on the reason-
ing that just because legislation is “under-inclusive,” it is not necessarily invalid for that reason
alone, as “governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their policies
implicate rights so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied.”  471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14
(1985).).
138 Brief for Appellant at 46, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11,
2013).
139 Brian Wansink & David Just, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on NYC
Public Health, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/
how-bloombergs-soft-drink-ban-will-backfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501.
140 See Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have Sweetened Beverages Contrib-
uted to the Obesity Epidemic?, 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 499, 502 (2010).  The director of
the New Balance Foundation Obesity Prevention Center at Boston Children’s Hospital, who
led a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that “I know of no other
category of food whose elimination can produce weight loss in such a short period of time,”
concluding that “[t]he most effective single target for an intervention aimed at reducing obes-
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III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BANNING AND TAXING: SOME
IMPLICATIONS FROM TOBACCO TAXES AND
FOOD INDUSTRY REGULATIONS
A. What Is So Special About Soda?
Understanding the uniqueness of soda products and their consump-
tion patterns will allow us to understand why sodas must be treated dif-
ferently than other types of products subject to sin taxes like tobacco.
Some of the differences between soda and tobacco or fast food favor
restrictions on soda.
First, there may be a stronger case for a soda ban than for a tobacco
or food ban because, while there may be no available free substitutes for
tobacco or food, there is a low- to no-cost alternative for soda drinks that
is readily available: water.  While some people may not enjoy drinking
regular water or lack access to water of good quality,141 limiting the
purchase of a product with a low- to no-cost substitute is definitely dif-
ferent from limiting purchase of a product with no such alternative.  Fur-
thermore, when people reduce their soda consumption, a majority of
them turn to water as a substitute.142  A recent Wall Street Journal online
poll indicated that 13% of the people either drink juice-based drinks or
energy drinks as an alternative to soda, possibly indicating that some
people are unaware that various sugary drinks other than soda can be
harmful to their health.143
Second, while fatty foods and sodas can both cause obesity, only
liquid calories such as those found in sugary beverages generally fail to
make us full.144  Later decreased consumption offsets 64% of food en-
ergy but only 9% of liquid energy.145  This suggests that curbing soda
consumption, rather than food consumption, might be more effective in
shaping a healthy diet and that therefore policies regulating sodas should
be implemented.
ity is sugary beverages.”  Sharon Begley, Can It! Soda Studies Cite Stronger Link to Obesity,
REUTERS (Sep. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-obesity-soda-
idUSBRE88K17820120921.
141 See Charles Duhigg, Millions in U.S. Drink Dirty Water, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/business/energy-environment/08water
.html?pagewnated=all&_r=0.
142 If You’ve Slowed Your Soda Consumption, What Are You Drinking Instead?, WALL
ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/community/groups/question-day-229/topics/if-youve-slowed-
your-soda (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (an online poll regarding what people drink as an alter-
native to soda).
143 Id.
144 See DeSantis, supra note 22, at 371.
145 Woodward-Lopez et al., supra note 140, at 502.
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Third, unlike food, which is a necessity, it is widely thought that
cigarettes are harmful when consumed in any quantity.146  The same is
true for sodas, including diet sodas.147  People who do not consume soda
are generally healthier than those who regularly consume soda.148  Thus
a ban on sale of large soda drinks in some places would cause inconve-
nience at most, rather than any sort of risk of nourishment deprivation.
At the same time, however, there is an interesting explanation for
why a sin tax has not worked for sodas when it has worked for other
products, such as tobacco.  While there is no doubt that the lack of a
successful soda tax is at least partially attributable to the enormous lob-
bying power of the American Beverage Association, there is an even
more fundamental reason: soda taxes have been unpopular.149
At first glance, it seems difficult to understand why taxing soda
would not be appealing to the public, since it serves the same purpose as
the sin tax on cigarettes: to generate revenue and deter behavior that has
negative societal consequences.150  Such taxes and fines, by aiming to
discourage certain activities, communicate that smokers and speeders are
doing something that is detrimental to society and deserve to be penal-
ized.151  Similarly, imposing a per-ounce soda tax would send the same
message.152
However, whereas only 19.3% of Americans aged eighteen and
older currently smoke,153 51% of Americans drink soda every day.154
The average American consumes 44.7 gallons of carbonated soft drinks a
year,155 and “[s]odas account for 28% of all beverages—water and milk
included—consumed in the United States.”156  In other words, the wide-
spread nature of soda consumption may be the ultimate reason that many
146 See Richard A. Daynard et al., Private Enforcement: Litigation as a Tool to Prevent
Obesity, 25 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 408, 408 (2004).
147 See supra Part I.A; Tanya Zuckerbrot, The Truth About Diet Drinks, FOX NEWS (Oct.
8, 2012), http://magazine.foxnews.com/food-wellness/truth-about-diet-drinks.
148 See generally, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, Sugary Drinks and Obesity Fact Sheet, http:/
/www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/sugary-drinks-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
149 DeSantis, supra note 22, at 369.
150 See Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) (explaining
that all fines, penalties, and taxes generate revenue and deter behavior).
151 DeSantis, supra note 22, at 365.
152 Id. at 369.
153 Brian King, et al., Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults Aged = 18
Years—United States, 2005–2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1207, 1208
(2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6035.pdf.
154 Lisa Nicita, Tempest in a Coffeepot, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 2008, at E1.
155 Mark Bittman, Bad Food?  Tax It, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/24/opinion/sunday/24bittman.html.  By comparison, Americans consume 20.8
gallons of beer, 20.4 gallons of milk, 28.3 gallons of bottled water, and 18.5 gallons of coffee.
Natalie Zmuda, Bottom’s Up! A Look at America’s Drinking Habits, ADVERTISING AGE (June
27, 2011), http://adage.com/article/news/consumers-drink-soft-drinks-water-beer/228422.
156 Helena Oliviero, A Rush in a Can, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 16, 2006, at C1.
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people oppose soda taxes157 and, therefore, some policy other than taxing
soda would be more likely to be approved by the general public.  Also,
the fact that it took longer for the public to understand the negative ef-
fects of soda consumption than those of smoking could have  played a
part in public’s opposition of soda taxes.158
Second, despite people’s growing awareness of obesity, many peo-
ple consume fast food and drink soda.  Compared to tobacco, which is
heavily addictive, food products are generally not considered to be inher-
ently addictive.159  Furthermore, multiple factors other than eating and
drinking habits, such as exercise and genetic makeup, influence a per-
son’s weight.160  Since this is the biggest flaw in the soda obesity argu-
ment, people who are against the Soda Ban make this argument most
frequently.161
Third, unlike the food and tobacco industries, where ethical viola-
tions negatively impacting consumer health have damaged public opin-
ion and served as a basis for lawsuits,162 the soda industry has been free
157 See DeSantis, supra note 22, at 365.
158 In 2005, the Center for the Science in the Public Interest proposed the idea of putting
warning labels on sodas. See Michael J. O’Flaherty, Beware: Warning Labels on Soft Drinks,
20 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1 (Nov. 4, 2005), http://www.wlf.org/upload/
110405LBOFlaherty.pdf.  It formally petitioned the Food and Drug Administration to require
“cigarette-style warnings” on non-diet soda labels that contain more than 1.1 grams of high
fructose corn syrup or other caloric sweetener per fluid ounce. Id.  Examples of proposed
warnings were “The U.S. Government recommends that you drink less (non-diet) soda to help
prevent weight gain, tooth decay, and other health problems.”; “To help protect your waistline
and your teeth, consider drinking diet sodas or water.”; “Drinking soft drinks instead of milk
or calcium-fortified beverages may increase your risk of brittle bones (osteoporosis).”; “Drink-
ing too many (non-diet) soft drinks could cause diabetes [or heart disease, high blood pressure,
osteoarthritis, cancer] by increasing your weight.” Id. at 1–2.  In California, drinks that con-
tain a certain amount of carcinogens are required to have a cancer warning label, and when the
state added ammonia sulfite to its list of known carcinogens, PepsiCo and Coca-Cola modified
its caramel coloring in their sodas to avoid the cancer warning label requirement. See Mikaele
Conley, Coke, Pepsi Skirt Cancer Warning Label, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2012/03/09/coke-pepsi-skirt-cancer-warning-label/.
159 See Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco? Lessons Learned from
Tobacco for Obesity Litigation, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 94 (2006).  This statement is not
without caveat.  Even if consuming a moderate amount of fast food and sodas may not lead to
obesity, it may still adversely affect people (e.g., visceral fat). See Jane Riley, Watch Out for
Fructose, THE GARDEN ISLAND (Sept. 29, 2013, 12:15 AM), http://thegardenisland.com/lifes-
tyles/health-med-fit/watch-out-for-fructose/article_f1672d26-28d2-11e3-a432-0019bb2963f4
.html.
160 Courtney, supra note 159, at 94.
161 See. e.g., Press Release, American Beverage Association, American Beverage Associ-
ation Statement on Children and Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Study (Aug. 5, 2013), http://
www.ameribev.org/files/news/aba-statement-on-pediatrics-study.pdf; Failure of the New York
City Soda Ban to Curb Sugary Beverage Consumption-Lindsey Rorden, CHALLENGING DOGMA
(May 5, 2013), http://challengingdogma-spring2013.blogspot.com/2013/05/failure-of-new-
york-city-soda-ban-to.html.
162 See Joshua Logan Pennel, Note, Big Food’s Trip Down Tobacco Road: What To-
bacco’s Past Indicate About Foods’ Future, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 112–13 (2009).
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from such outright violations.  For example, tobacco companies con-
cealed the addictive and harmful nature of cigarettes by conducting re-
search under close management of their legal counsels, thus allowing
unfavorable findings to be inadmissible in court due to attorney-client
privilege.163  Also, major fast food industry brands such as McDonald’s
and Burger King suffered from deteriorating public perception for failing
to report certain facts (e.g., McDonald’s failed to report the use of beef
fat in the cooking of its fries) and for lying on their nutritional labels by
stating that their foods contained less fat than they actually did.164  In
contrast, the beverage industry has been relatively free of such accusa-
tions of ethical violations related to consumer health.  This could be due
to many reasons, but it could be contributed mostly to the continuing
success of beverage companies in creating new products that both spur
sales and appear responsive to consumers’ health-consciousness.  Nu-
merous beverage companies have introduced a diet or light version of
their original drinks and have also introduced various sizes.165  These
tactics do not explicitly violate any health-related ethical rules, but ulti-
mately achieve the same goal pursued by both the tobacco and fast food
industries: increasing sales by disingenuously presenting their product as
healthy.  According to Harvard School of Public Health, although artifi-
cial sweeteners can make a person lose weight in the short term (because
artificial sweeteners deliver zero carbohydrates, fat, and protein), they
can’t directly influence calorie intake or blood sugar.166  Thus these
sweeteners can disrupt the body’s ability to gauge how many calories are
being taken in and may promote weight gain in the long term.167
Lastly, while “[c]igarette . . . consumption by minors, as a result of
targeted advertisements, is illegal, and clearly affronts parental authority
and autonomy,”168 sodas are legal for people of all ages.  According to a
163 See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota
Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 499–500 (1999).
164 Pennel, supra note 162, at 113.
165 See e.g., Philip H. Dougherty, Advertising; Diet Coke Prepares Its Debut, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/09/business/advertising-diet-coke-prepares-
its-debut.html; Andrew Martin, Did McDonald’s Give In to Temptation? N.Y. TIMES (July, 22,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/business/yourmoney/22feed.html (illustrating that
large soda sizes have been the subject of growing concern for a long time).
166 HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, Artificial Sweeteners, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutri-
tionsource/healthy-drinks/artificial-sweeteners/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013)
167 Id.; see also Nicholas Bakalar, Risks; Diet Soft Drinks Linked to Heart Disease, N.Y.
TIMES (FEB. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/health/research/diet-soft-drinks-
linked-to-risk-of-heart-disease.html?_r=0 (study published in the Journal of General Internal
Medicine found that daily consumption of diet soda was associated with an increased risk for
stroke, heart attack, and death).
168 Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating Fast
Food Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity
Epidemic, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 478 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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poll conducted by the National Health and Nutrition Examination Sur-
vey, from 2005 to 2008, approximately one-half of the population aged 2
and older consumed sugar drink every day.169  This finding was rein-
forced by a Gallup poll in 2012, which revealed that forty eight percent
of surveyed American drink soda on a daily basis, and that the average
daily intake among them was 2.6 glasses per day.170  On the other hand,
a study done by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Office
on Smoking and Health—using data from the 2011 National Health In-
terview Survey (NHIS)—found that nineteen percent of all adults (aged
18 years or older) in the U.S. smoke cigarettes.171  This again factors in
to the larger target consumer group for sodas, and the likelihood that a
soda ban may face relatively greater opposition.
The differences between tobacco and food and soda explain why the
public might be more sympathetic towards defendants in potential soda-
related cases than those in food and tobacco lawsuits.  People’s sympathy
towards soda companies may be indicated by New Yorkers’ opinions on
Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed Soda Ban: 60% opposed it.172  However,
the history of the tobacco industry and the food industry, both of which
became the target of countless lawsuits despite strong initial public sup-
port,173 may hint that the soda industry could take a similar path.
169 Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Consumption of Sugar Drinks in the United States, 2005-
2008, NCHS DATA BRIEF, NO. 71, 2 (National Center for Health Statistics, MD) Aug. 2011,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db71.pdf.
170 Lydia Saad, Nearly Half of Americans Drink Soda Daily, GALLUP (July 23, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/156116/nearly-half-americans-drink-soda-daily.aspx.
171 Israel Agaku, Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2011, 61
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 889, 889-94(2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6144.pdf.
172 New Yorkers’ Opinions on Sugary Drinks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2012/08/22/nyregion/new-yorkers-opinions-on-sugary-drinks.html?ref=
nyregion.
173 Pennel, supra note 162, at 103–107.  During the 1950s, tobacco’s popularity reached
its height; despite scientific evidence linking smoking and lung cancer, there were relatively
few lawsuits against the tobacco companies. Id. at 103.  Moreover, the tobacco industry suc-
cessfully defended itself against the few lawsuits that came its way. Id.  In the 1960s and early
1970s, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965), and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970), which required that cigarettes be labeled as harmful and restricted the market-
ing of cigarettes. Id. at 103–04.  By the 1970s, cigarette use by the general population had
decreased, and the public opinion had started to shift. Id. at 104.  In the 1980s and 1990s, new
data was discovered and new legislation was introduced (e.g. outlawing smoking within the
workplace passed in San Francisco), and the tobacco industry could no longer rely on its
previous tactics (e.g., concealing ethical violations and the addictive and harmful nature of
cigarettes). Id. at 104, 112–13.
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B. What the Tobacco and Fast Food Industries’ Pasts Could Indicate
About the Soda Industry’s Future
Understanding the history of the fast food and tobacco industries
allows for a comparison of where the soda industry currently stands and
where it may be headed.  The three industries are comparable on four
issues.
First, since people voluntarily use these industries’ products, all
three industries could defend against lawsuits by arguing contributory
negligence or assumption of risk by consumers.174  Contributory negli-
gence arises when the plaintiff’s failure to exercise care is one of the
causes of the harm.175  Assumption of risk is a defense in cases involving
risks that are known or that a reasonable person would know.176  How-
ever, such defenses would probably fail if the manufacturers intention-
ally concealed the risks associated with their products.177  Furthermore,
the defense of assumption of risk would probably not succeed in obesity
litigation involving children considered too young to understand and “ap-
preciate the nature of the risks associated with eating fast food or junk
foods,” or if the food industry failed to inform consumers of risks associ-
ated with eating these foods.178  Similarly, a contributory fault defense
may be unavailable if the food industry acted recklessly or intentionally
in causing consumers harm.179  In the tobacco cases, although plaintiffs
voluntary used the products, juries nonetheless imposed liability.180
Second, all three industries target (or in the case of tobacco, have
historically targeted) vulnerable groups, especially children, in their ad-
vertising campaigns.181
Third, all three industries have an overwhelming amount of lobby-
ing power.  For example, the lobbying power of tobacco industry groups
in Washington is demonstrated by the tobacco industry’s successful ef-
forts to exclude its products from the jurisdiction of the Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Commission (CPSC) and from the Environmental Protection
174 Alyse Meislik, Note, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: The Obesity Epidemic and
Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 803 (2004); cf. Pelman v. McDon-
ald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531–33, 540–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims that McDonald’s food is inherently dangerous and that McDonald’s failed to warn
consumers of the food’s unhealthiness on the grounds that it is a well-known fact that fast food
is usually unhealthy).
175 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 199 (2000).
176 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
177 Meislik, supra note 174, at 803.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See John A. Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food Com-
panies, 12 WIDENER L. J. 103, 113 (2003).
181 Meislik, supra note 174, at 804–05.
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Agency’s (EPA) jurisdiction under the Toxic Substances Control Act.182
The result of these exclusions is that the CPSC lacks the authority to
issue and enforce mandatory standards, ban, recall, or conduct research
on the potential hazards associated with tobacco products183 and that the
EPA cannot write and enforce environmental and health regulations of
tobacco products.184  Further, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) could not classify tobacco as a pharmaceutical, and thus could not
regulate its production.185  The lobbying power of the food industry is
illustrated by the House’s approval of the Personal Responsibility in
Food Consumption Act, which aimed to prevent frivolous lawsuits
against the manufacturers, distributors, or sellers of food or non-alcohol
beverage products.186
Fourth, the health and economic costs of tobacco and fast food
served as catalysts for change in tobacco and fast food policy.187  Simi-
larly, the rising costs related to obesity, which are predicted to continue
to rise in the coming decade, may compel similar soda industry policy
reform.188
The similarities between sodas, smoking, and fast food hint that the
regulatory history of tobacco and food may be portentous for regulatory
efforts such as the Soda Ban.  Also, the uniqueness of soda, as described
in Part III.A, explains why taxing soda has not gained popularity among
the general public.  However, government regulations can be used to
shape individual and public behavior.  For example, many extensive
studies show that “[s]ignificant increases in tobacco taxes are a highly
effective tobacco control strategy and lead to significant improvements
182 Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health Judicial De-
cision-Making Canon, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 281, 282 (2002); see generally 15 U.S.C.
§ 2052(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“The term ‘consumer product’ . . . does not include . . . tobacco and
tobacco products . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘hazardous substance’ shall
not apply to . . . tobacco and tobacco products . . . .”).
183 See Who We Are—What We Do for You, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-
Are—-What-We-Do-for-You/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
184 See Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-
and-what-we-do (last updated June 3, 2013).
185 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26, 139-40
(1999).
186 H.R. REP. NO.108–432, at 1 (2004).
187 See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal
Accountability for Obesity, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 212–14 (2003), available at http://con-
tent.healthaffairs.org/content/22/6/207.full.html; The Political Economy of Tobacco Taxation,
WHO, http://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/en_tfi_tob_tax_chapter4.pdf.
188 See Munger, supra note 168, at 459 (discussing how the medical costs of obesity in
the United States now exceed the medical costs of smoking).
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in public health.”189  A study evaluating the effect of state tax increases
on cigarettes sales from 1955 to 1988 found  that: (1) cigarette tax in-
creases were associated with an average decline in cigarette consumption
of three cigarette packs per capita (about 2.4%); and (2) larger tax in-
creases were associated with larger declines in consumption.190  Over the
past fifty years, regulatory policies like tobacco advertisement bans,
package warnings, and cigarette taxes have decreased the prevalence of
smoking by almost 34% in the United States.191  Just as cigarette taxation
was successful in curbing the consumption of cigarettes, an excise tax on
sugary drinks could be effective in discouraging consumption.  Follow-
ing the same logic, the ban of large soda drinks in New York City-regu-
lated establishments, would probably prove effective in decreasing the
consumption of soda.
In the 1960s and 70s, suits against tobacco manufacturers and anti-
obesity campaigns against junk food manufactures faced strong opposi-
tion from those who believed that people should be able to freely make
personal choices on what to do or what to eat, even if they suffer from
lung cancer or become overweight due to such choices.192  However, af-
ter two decades of unsuccessful breach of warranty, product liability, and
negligence lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers,193 some state courts
started applying the market share principle.  The market share principle
is a judicially-created exception to basic tort principles that relieves
plaintiffs of the requirement of identifying a single tortfeasor and shifts
the burden to the defendant, who must prove that the plaintiff’s injury
was not caused by its product.194  Defendants failing to meet their burden
are responsible for the proportion of the damages judgment represented
189 Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control Strategy, 21 TOBACCO
CONTROL 172, 172 (2012), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/172.full
.pdftˇml.
190 See generally, Dan E. Peterson, The Effect of State Cigarette Tax Increases on Ciga-
rette Sales, 1955 to 1988, 82 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 94, 94-96 (1992).  A study by the Con-
gressional Budget Office estimated that implementing a fifty cents per pack tax on cigarettes
would lead to 1.4 million fewer smokers, with gains concentrated among younger Americans.
Also, a 2012 study in the journal Tobacco Control found that the implementation of tobacco
taxes decreases the intensity of smoking, especially among the most intense smokers. See
Sarah Kliff, How Obama’s Tobacco Tax Would Drive Down Smoking Rates, WASHINGTON
POST (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/11/how-
obamas-tobacco-tax-would-drive-down-smoking-rates.
191 Prabhat Jha & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Economics of Global Tobacco Control, 321
BMJ 358, 358–361 (2000).
192 Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public
Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 839, 846 (2005); see Spain v. Brown &Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101, 120 (Ala. 2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting); Courtney, supra
note 159, at 104.
193 See Leila B. Boulton, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to
Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 643, 644 n.4 (1987).
194 Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ohio 1987).
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by their share of the market.195  The market share principle allows for
joint and several liability, pitting liable tobacco companies against each
other in contribution actions.196  Further momentum gained against the
tobacco industry as some states outlawed smoking in certain public
places.197  The tobacco industry’s entrance into the Tobacco Master Set-
tlement Agreement (“MSA”) with the attorneys general of forty-six
states, as well as those of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands,198 and numerous smaller manufacturers (collectively
known as “Participating Manufacturers),199 which cost Big Tobacco bil-
lions of dollars and set strict marketing and advertising standards,200 was
another major example of the dramatic shift in the legal fortunes of com-
panies manufacturing and advertising tobacco.201  In essence, the agree-
ment was presented by the state attorneys general to make a deal with the
tobacco companies202: the states, in exchange for agreement of the com-
panies to make specified payments to the settling states (exceeding $200
billion through 2025) and to abide by extensive restrictions on the adver-
tising, promotion and marketing of cigarettes, settled their Medicaid law-
suits against the tobacco industry and released the companies from
claims by the states “generally related to the use, sale distribution, manu-
facture, development, advertising, marketing or health effects of, the ex-
posure to, or research statements, or warnings regarding, Tobacco
Products.”203
195 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912, 937 (1980); “Market share” is defined as the percentage of the total sales in a given
market that is controlled by a given firm. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (6th ed. 1990).
196 Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General’s Warning: Legislation May Now be
Hazardous to Tobacco Companies’ Health, 28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1995).
197 See generally Gene Borio, The Twentieth Century, 1950-1999—The Battle is Joined,
in TOBACCO TIMELINE, TOBACCO.ORG (2007), http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/To-
bacco_History20-2.html (discussing how seminal legislation, judicial opinions, and even sci-
entific studies can show how tobacco changed from a commonly accepted commodity to a
highly regulated drug).
198 Master Settlement Agreement, National Association of Attorneys General (1998).
http://web.archive.org/web/20080625084126/http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/
msa/msa-pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
199 MSA Settlement Proposals: Why Sign the MSA?, National Association of Attorneys
General, http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa_settlement_proposal.
200 See Shital A. Patel, The Tobacco Litigation Merry-Go-Round: Did the MSA Make it
Stop?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 615, 634–35 (2005).
201 See Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State Statutes Imple-
menting Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R.6th 435 (2007).
202 See Richard A. Daynard et al., The Multistate Master Settlement Agreement and the
Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: an Analysis of Selected Topics and Provisions of
Multistate Master Settlement Agreement of November 23, 1998, The Tobacco Control Re-
source Center, Inc., at Northeastern University School of Law (Mar. 24, 1999), http://www
.tobacco.neu.edu/tobacco_control/resources/msa/.
203 Id.
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As for food, as people started to look past personal responsibility
and focused on the cultural, corporate, socioeconomic, and environmen-
tal causes of obesity,204 the fast food industry became more amenable to
settlements in lawsuits.  In an example of a more aggressive regulatory
targeting of the industry as a cause of obesity, the Board of Supervisors
of San Francisco, California, passed an ordinance requiring that Happy
Meals and other fast food meals that include toys and are marketed to
children meet new nutritional standards, or be removed from menus
starting in December 2011.205  The new standard required that food and
beverages contain fewer than 600 calories, and that less than 35% of total
calories come from fat.206  Demonstrating the industry’s increased ame-
nability to settlement, McDonald’s chose to settle one fat content lawsuit
in 2005 for $8.5 million.207  In that case, McDonald’s was accused of
failing to keep its promise to reduce its use of trans fat.208  The settle-
ment not only cost McDonald’s millions of dollars, but also required
McDonald’s to give public notice that the oil it used contained trans
fat.209  A similar lawsuit brought by the Center for Science in the Public
Interest against Burger King, the Center claimed that the company know-
ingly put their customers’ health at risk by using trans fat.210  As a result
of this suit, Burger King eventually pledged to phase out trans fat by
November 2008.211
Similar to what has happened in the tobacco industry and food in-
dustry, a shift in public attitude towards the soda industry may give polit-
ical support to actions by judges and politicians aiming to curb soda
drink consumption.  Although a majority of the New York City popula-
tion does not currently appear to support the Soda Ban, as with the to-
bacco industry in the 1980s and the food industry in early 2000s, public
opinion may shift as further research reveals the health effects of sugary
drinks and resulting societal costs.
204 Courtney, supra note 159, at 69.
205 Michael Martinez, San Francisco Overrides Mayoral Veto, Bans Happy Meals with
Toys, CNN (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/23/california.happy.meals.ban/
index.html.
206 Id.
207 McDonald’s Settles Fat Lawsuit for $8.5 Million, INS. J. (Feb. 15, 2005), http://www
.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/02/15/51451.htm.
208 Id.  Trans fat are considered to be the worst type of fat because it not only raises the
“bad” cholesterol (low-density lipoprotein) like other fats, but also lowers the “good” choles-
terol (high-density lipoprotein). See The Truth About Fats: Bad and Good, HARVARD MEDICAL
SCHOOL FAMILY HEALTH GUIDE, http://www.health.harvard.edu/fhg/updates/Truth-about-
fats.shtml (last updated Nov. 2007).
209 McDonald’s Settles Fat Lawsuit for $8.5 Million, INS. J. (Feb. 15, 2005), http://www
.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/02/15/51451.htm.
210 Burger King Hit with Trans Fat Lawsuit, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST (May
16, 2007), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200705161.html.
211 Id.
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In sum, there seems to be a common pattern, as shown by the exper-
iences of the tobacco and fast food industries, in successful implementa-
tion of regulatory policies targeting widely-consumed products with
known adverse health effects.  Once scientific evidence of tobacco-re-
lated harm and fast-food-related harm was established, the responsibility
of the government to inform consumers of the related health conse-
quences arose.  Gradually thereafter, targeted regulation successfully
changed marketing practices and consumer behavior.  Today there is am-
ple scientific evidence of soda-related harm, and therefore, the govern-
ment has the responsibility to inform the public of such harm.  Thus,
some sort of regulatory intervention like the Soda Ban could be an effec-
tively targeted regulatory mechanism for reducing obesity or improving
public health.
C. Taxing and Banning Sugary Beverages
As of 2009, thirty-three states had sales taxes on soft drinks, but the
taxes are too small to affect consumption; in many cases, consumers did
not know the taxes existed.212  In addition, the revenues generated by
these taxes were not used to fund nutrition programs.213  Experts have
stated that “fat taxes” would have to increase the price of unhealthy food
and drinks by as much as 20% to cut consumption by a sufficient margin
to reduce obesity and other obesity-related diseases.214  However, as pre-
viously mentioned, plans for taxing soda drinks in New York City have
failed due to both the beverage industry’s lobbying power and New York
City’s limited authority to implement tax policies.  Although a literal
reading of the New York State Constitution suggests that the State’s pre-
emptive authority is limited when it seeks to restrict the activities of a
particular jurisdiction,215 New York courts have interpreted this restric-
tion so narrowly that, in practice, almost any legislation passed by New
York City can be preempted by state legislative action.216 Because im-
212 Brownell et al., supra note 19, at 1599.
213 Id.  For example, the majority of the revenue from soda sales taxes that were enacted
from mid- to late 1900s were mostly used to fund general funds. See Jacobson & Brownell,
supra note 18, at 855–56.
214 Denis Campbell, ‘Fat Tax’ on Unhealthy Food Must Raise Prices by 20% to Have
Effect, Says Study, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/may/
16/fat-tax-unhealthy-food-effect.
215 The New York State Constitution places limits on “special legislation.”  Such “special
legislation” can be passed only at the request of the local government under a home rule
message or in emergency situations. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
216 In practice, however, these restrictions on special legislation are limited by the judici-
ary’s willingness to defer to legislative judgments as to what constitutes an issue of statewide
concern and, therefore qualifies as general, rather than special, legislation. See, e.g., Patrol-
men’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 767 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the
safety of New York City residents was a statewide issue, and therefore, the New York Legisla-
ture had authority to pass laws affecting New York City’s contact with its police union, limit-
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plementing a partial ban on soda does not rely on New York City’s lim-
ited authority to implement tax policies, nor is it as vulnerable to
lobbying as a soda tax, New York City may have relatively more success
implementing a soda ban.
While enforcing an outright product ban would restrict all soda re-
tailers, New York City seeks to impose regulations merely restricting the
sale of sixteen-ounce sugary drinks in establishments regulated by the
city’s health department.217  In addition, the soda restriction could be
considered as a type of retailing limit: a sales location limit.218  Retailing
restrictions such as age limits, time-of-day limits, and product display
limits are widespread for many products.219  For example, retailing lim-
its, like a requirement that candy be placed above a certain height (e.g.,
higher than a child’s eye level) or behind the counter, have proven effec-
tive in discouraging impulsive purchases.220  In a similar fashion, the
Soda Ban would also seek to reduce impulsive purchases of large sodas.
State and local governments may legitimately impose conditions on sales
to limit a product’s detrimental effect on public health.  For example,
California has been successful in prohibiting tobacco retailers from sell-
ing single cigarettes and requiring them to abide by a minimum pack
size.221  Given these many examples of laws and regulations legitimately
limiting product access in response to health concerns, the Soda Ban’s
restrictions appear reasonable.222
D. Aftermath of the Soda Ban
The soda drink industry consists of a series of stakeholders along
the supply chain, beginning with the beverage company and ending with
ing the City’s bargaining power and preempting the City’s own mediation laws for negotiating
with public employee unions).
217 Erin Drukin, Judge Halts Bloomberg’s Large Soda Ban Before It’s Set to Go into
Effect, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bloomberg-
soda-ban-national-article-1.1285235.
218 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF, CODE 22960, 22962 (West 2005) (prohibiting access to
cigarettes without the assistance of a clerk).  An example of a sales location limit would be
requiring that candy or other products to be restricted to certain locations in retail outlet. See
Randolph Kline, Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food Marketing and Con-
sumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603,
616 (2006).
219 See, e.g., Thomas R. Frieden, Forward to U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, at i (2012), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/preventing-
youth-tobacco-use/full-report.pdf.
220 Rebecca E. Lee et al., The Relation Between Community Bans of Self-Service Tobacco
Displays and Store Environment and Between Tobacco Accessibility and Merchant Incentives,
91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2019, 2019, 2021(2001).
221 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 308.2 (West 2005) (prohibiting single cigarette sales);
CAL PENAL CODE 308.3 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring a minimum pack size).
222 See Kline, supra note 218, at 617–18.
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the retailer.  Many industries, including bottling companies, restaurants,
theatres, and vending machine businesses’ interests are closely aligned
with the soda industry, and thus, are potentially affected by increased
regulatory control of the soda industry.
In predicting how consumers will behave if the Soda Ban is imple-
mented, one must consider the relevant background of how large-sized
beverages were introduced.  Starbucks introduced its Trenta size for its
iced beverages in 2011 in at least fourteen states, adding to the already
existing Short, Tall, Grande, and Venti sizes.223  A Trenta-sized drink
(916 milliliters) is larger than the average capacity of the adult human
stomach of 900 milliliters.224  Assuming that Starbucks, like any corpo-
ration, exists to maximize its profits, the intention of introducing the
Trenta size may well have been to create a demand for a super-sized
drink, or at least to implicitly encourage people to drink more coffee—
”[t]he problem is, whether you want so much food or not, the more
you’re served, the more you eat.”225  While rise in portion size may be
partially attributable to consumers’ desire to maximize value,226 the fact
that beverage and fast-food companies do not fulfill consumers’ demand
by offering lower prices on smaller instead of bigger portions227 illus-
trates that their motive is skewed toward maximizing profits rather than
fulfilling the needs of customers.  As critical realists state, “manufactures
223 Alexandra Corbett, Thirsty?  Starbucks Supersizes to the Trenta, NORWALK (Jan. 18,
2011), http://norwalk.dailyvoice.com/news/thirsty-starbucks-supersizes-trenta.
224 Andrew Barr, Graphic: How Big, Exactly, is Starbucks’ New ‘Trenta’ size?, NAT’L
POST (Jan. 17, 2011), http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/01/17/graphic-how-big-exactly-is-
starbucks-new-trenta-size/.
225 A study by the Penn State University’s College of Health and Human Development
found that when people were served with varying size of food portions, most of them did not
notice the difference, and everyone, “men or women, dieters or non-dieters, people who were
overweight or not, people who habitually clean their plates or not,” responded to the increased
size by eating more.  John Mckenzie, Food Portion Sizes Have Grown – A Lot, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 21, 2003), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129685&page=1.  Another interesting
result of that same study was that people reported similar ratings of hunger and fullness after
each meal despite the intake differences. Id.  Another effect of continuous exposure to larger
food portion sizes is “portion distortion,” where people perceive larger potions sizes as an
appropriate amount to consumer at a single occasion. See Ruth E. Litchfield & Mary Beth
Penisten, Nutrition Education Delivered at The State Fair: Are Your Portions in Proportion?
36 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 275, 275 (2004), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/sci-
ence/article/pii/S1499404606603928; Jaime Schwartz & Carol Byrd-Bredbenner, Portion Dis-
tortion: Typical Portion Sizes Selected by Young Adults, 106 J. AM DIET ASSOC. 1412, 1412
(2006), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002822306013836.
226 See Ingrid  HM Steenhuis & Willemijn M Vermeer, Portion Size: Review and Frame-
work for Interventions, 6 INT’L J. BEHAVIORAL NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 58, 59
(2006), available at http://www.ijbnpa.org/content/pdf/1479-5868-6-58.pdf
227 See O’Dougherty M, Nutrition Labeling and Value Size Pricing at Fast-Food Restau-
rants: A Consumer Perspective, 20 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOT. 247 (2006) (study showing that
62% of participants supported a law requiring nutrition labels on restaurant menus, and 34%
supporting a law requiring restaurants to offer lower prices on smaller instead of bigger
portions).
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constantly adapt to exploit consumers’ cognitive tendencies and manipu-
late the commercial environment in which consumers are making
purchasing decisions, both conscious and unconscious.”228  Furthermore,
it has been suggested that if people are offered larger portions of food,
they eat significantly more without realizing it.229  Conversely, perhaps
caloric intake can be reduced over time by reducing portion size and the
size of the dish in which food is served.230
Another relevant point is how sensitive people are to marginal
prices.  In economic terms, the point where marginal cost and marginal
benefit meet is the optimal activity level.231  However, because the dif-
ference in marginal price for consumers decreases as the size of the soda
increases, a person would likely buy a larger soda even if it only provides
a small marginal benefit.232  While consideration of value for money
228 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Legal
Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY 229, 258–61 (2001) (“[T]he market is
. . . more powerful than the government at manipulating consumer perceptions and prefer-
ences.”).  Critical realism takes the position that there is an objective reality and the objects of
scientific study will thus always exist in the same manner regardless of knowledge gained
about them.  Paul Taylor et al., Tobacco Smoking and Incarceration Expanding the ‘Last Poor
Smoker’ Thesis, INTERNET J. CRIMINOLOGY 4 (2012), http://www.internetjournalofcriminology
.com/Taylor_Ogden_Corteen_Tobacco_Smoking%20_and_Incaraceration_IJC_Dec_2012
.pdf.  Critical realists generally think that because the process of an investigation is ultimately
the product of social relations, investigations have limitations. Id. at 4.  In the view of critical
realists, “current work, theory or ‘evidence’ is always open to criticism and change and the
difference between a theory and its relation to real events[ ] arises due to the attempt to explain
an underlying structure which is not necessarily observable (albeit still real).” Id. at 4.
229 See Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1696–97 (2004); see also MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO
EAT 504, 506 (2006) (describing “portion distortion” and powerful but unconscious “eat me”
effect of large portions).
230 See generally BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE
THINK(2006). Stated more technically, “unfamiliar optimization is impossible within the cog-
nitive bounds of rationality, when decision time is scarce.” Reinhard Selten, What is Bounded
Rationality?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 13, 69–70 (G. Gigerenzer
& R. Selten eds., 2002). The serving size bias affects caloric consumption even if the consum-
ers have been educated about it.  Wanksink concludes:
No one is immune to serving-size norms—not even “intelligent, informed” people
who have been lectured on the subject ad nauseum.  In the end, setting the table with
the wrong dinner plates or serving bowls—the big ones—sets the stage for overeat-
ing.  And there are heavyweight consequences . . .
BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING 69, 70 (2006).
231 See C.R. Thomas & S.C. Maurice, Marginal Analysis for Optimal Decisions, MC-
GRAWHILL, http://answers.mheducation.com/business/economics/business-economics/margi-
nal-analysis-optimal-decisions (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
232 See Willemijn M. Vermeer et al., Portion Size: A Qualitative Study of Consumers’
Attitudes Toward Point-of-Purchase Interventions Aimed at Portion Size, 25 HEALTH EDUC.
RES. 109, 113 (2009), available at http://her.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/1/109.full.pdftˇml.
For examples of non-proportional pricing of soda drinks see From Wallet to Waistline, NA-
TIONAL ALLIANCE FOR NUTRITION AND ACTIVITY 8–10 tbl.2 (June 2012), http://www.cspinet
.org/w2w.pdf (e.g., in 2002, McDonald’s sold a small sixteen ounce Coca-Cola for $1.04,
medium twenty-one ounce for $1.20, large thirty-two ounce for $1.44, and super size forty-two
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strongly guides consumers toward buying larger portions,233 a study
found that when confronted with proportional pricing, overweight fast
food restaurant visitors were less likely to choose large soft drink
sizes.234  If consumers know that the increase in the marginal price of
drinks decreases as the size of the drink increases, they may buy larger
drinks than they actually need or want.  In other words, consumers, in the
absence of the marginal price curve, may not consume the largest drinks
available.  Thus, if the Soda Ban is implemented, people will no longer
be motivated by incremental gains along the marginal curve.
Furthermore, since children develop eating habits and brand loyal-
ties before becoming overweight,235 reduced soda consumption resulting
from the implementation of the Soda Ban could help shape a healthier
diet for children and for the general population in the long-term.  One
difference between adults and children is that, whereas adults are rela-
tively more aware that their consumption choices are shaped by market-
ing tactics, children are subconsciously heavily influenced by food
industry advertising.236  The Soda Ban could thus be particularly helpful
in reducing the exposure of children to unhealthy beverages, and promot-
ing more healthful consumption habits for long-term benefit.
ounce for 1.64).  In calculating the marginal cost, the marginal benefit must be discounted
because there is a time delay between the time at which people decide they want to consume
and the time when they actually do consume.  For example, a person who discounts all times
in the future at a rate higher than the pure time discount rate, but trades off consumption in
future states at the time discount rate will want to begin the diet tomorrow.  This is because the
long-term benefits justify the lost utility tomorrow, but not today, as the immediate gratifica-
tion from food is high.  If that person is hungry and a vending machine filled with cookies is
ten feet away, that person might eat mid-afternoon cookies even if he is on a diet since the diet
can always start tomorrow.  The same person, however, might not be willing to walk ten
minutes to and from the store to get cookies since the bene?ts of eating these cookies are too
far away.  “Many behavioral change programs—like those involved with smoking and drink-
ing cessation as well as weight loss—encourage keeping the offending items as far away as
possible.  Raising time costs is believed to reduce consumption.”  David M. Cutler et al., Why
Have Americans Become More Obese? 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 93, 113-14 (2003), available
at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jesse.shapiro/research/obesity.pdf.
233 Vermeer et al., supra note 232, at 110.
234 However, the study concluded with a caveat that among the general public, propor-
tional pricing did not reduce consumers’ size choices. See Willemijn M. Vermeer et al., Value
for Money or Making The Healthy Choice: The Impact of Proportional Pricing on Consumers’
Portion Size Choices, 20 EUR. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 65, 65 (2009), available at http://
eurpub.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/1/65.full.pdftˇml.
235 See generally Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing Di-
rected at Children and Adolescents in the US, 1 INT’L J. BEHAVIORAL NUTRITION & PHYSICAL
ACTIVITY 3 (2004), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov.proxy.library.cornell.edu/pmc/articles/
PMC416565/pdf/1479-5868-1-3.pdf.
236 See Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 79 (2006)
(revealing that children do not understand that marketing techniques are commercially
motivated).
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The impact of the Soda Ban on big beverage companies would not
be as bad as an outright ban of all types of sugary beverages in all places,
but it would definitely bring some change.237  When the tobacco industry
faced fundamental changes due to restrictions on tobacco and smoking in
the United States, it diversified company holdings, expanded the industry
into developing nations, and pioneered alternative tobacco products.  The
beverage industry has embraced the latter two practices, and some bever-
age companies have diversified company holdings.238  The change in
beverage companies’ net profits resulting from the Soda Ban would de-
pend on profit offsets, which would partially depend on whether their
alternative products or marketing strategies were successful enough to
cover the lost sales caused by the soda ban.  While the lost revenue from
the Ban for beverage sellers may vary in the short- and long-terms, it is
unlikely to exceed the direct cost-saving of $4.7 million—New York De-
partment of Health’s estimate of obesity-related costs saved by the
Ban239—and the other indirect costs resulting from obesity.  Further-
more, as with the implementation of Starbucks’ mandatory calorie
counts, the Ban may not result in significant change in beverage calories
purchased, as sugary beverages of more than sixteen ounces will still be
available to consumers.240
CONCLUSION
New York City’s Soda Ban evokes concerns of paternalism.  The
public was mostly concerned with whether the Ban infringed on freedom
of choice, and the New York County Supreme Court and the First De-
237 For example, because only the businesses that are regulated by New York City are
subject to the Ban, the Soda Ban leaves out large companies like 7-Eleven and other grocery
stores.  Some worried that the Ban may selectively harm small businesses. See, e.g., Jason
Kessler, CNN, Groups: NYC Soda Unfair to Small, Minority-Owned Businesses (Jan. 25,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/health/new-york-large-drinks/index.html; Paul
Frumkin, Restaurant Industry Leaders Oppose New York Soda Ban (June 1, 2012), http://nrn
.com/latest-headlines/restaurant-industry-leaders-oppose-proposed-new-york-soda-ban.
238 Most of the major beverage companies have diversified company holdings.  For exam-
ple, Coca-Cola Company, which mainly produces syrup concentrate, holds numerous subsidi-
ary beverage brands.  Its notable subsidiary holdings include a major bottler in North America,
Coca Cola Refreshments, and its foreign subsidiaries. See Subsidiaries of The Coca-Cola
Company as of October 2, 2011, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/
000119312511317175/d232803dex21.htm.  Starbucks and Kraft also have diversified com-
pany holdings. See Subsidiaries of Starbucks Corporation, http://pdf.secdatabase.com/2646/
0001193125-11-317175.pdf; Kraft Foods Group, Inc. List of Subsidiaries, http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1545158/000119312513118824/d463856dex211.htm.
239 See Zachary Stieber, The Cost of Complying with NYC’s Soda Ban, THE EPOCH TIMES
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/the-cost-of-complying-with-
nyc-s-soda-ban-350678.html.
240 See Anna Cooperberg, Fast-Food Outlets Prepare to Lose Over Big Soda Ban, MID-
TOWN GAZETTE (Oct. 4, 2012), http://themidtowngazette.com/2012/10/fast-food-outlets-pre
pare-to-lose-over-big-soda-ban.
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partment of the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court
relied on separation of powers principles and the arbitrary and capricious
standard to hold the Ban legally invalid.  While the legal debate on the
Soda Ban has raised various constitutional issues, this Note has further
considered the economic and social aspects of the Ban.
Sodas have not only been scientifically linked to obesity, which has
been linked to numerous fatal diseases, and has also recently been cate-
gorized as a disease by the American Association.  Beyond the harm to
individuals, medical expenses related to obesity have become an exces-
sive burden on the government and taxpayers.  So far, beverage compa-
nies have not accepted much responsibility for the damage caused by
their products, nor have they taken the threat of federal regulation seri-
ously.  Therefore, a critical need exists to regulate the devastating jugger-
naut that is the soda industry.
Unfortunately, this need has yet to be met.  Unlike the tobacco in-
dustry and fast food industry, the beverage industry is perceived to be
relatively free of ethical violations that affect health, and a greater num-
ber of people consume sodas compared to cigarettes or fast food.  Per-
haps due to the uniquely widespread nature of soda consumption, the
anti-soda movement has not yet garnered significant support, influence,
or exposure.  Having learned from past experience that the beverage in-
dustry enjoys influence over lawmakers, New York City has tried to pre-
vent obesity by implementing a local ban of large-sized sodas in certain
retail outlets.
The New York City’s Board of Health’s efforts, however, have been
crushed, but with little persuasive justification.  While the First Depart-
ment of the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court has
held that all four factors of the Boreali were present in the Soda Ban, this
Note disagrees.  First, the promulgation of the Soda Ban was based
solely on healthy concerns, not as a result of balancing of social and
economic factors, and therefore the Soda Ban must be distinguished from
the regulation challenged in Boreali.  Second, while the authority of the
Board is not without limits, the language of the New York City Charter
indicates that the Board is permitted to engage in interstitial rulemaking
regulations regarding matters inherently harmful to the health of City
residents—an obesity epidemic should surely be the qualify as such a
matter.  Third, because the Soda Ban is different from other resolutions
and bills proposed by City Council and State legislature, the Board did
come up with its own answer to an unresolved issue.  Lastly, as the Soda
Ban was proposed to curb one of the factors affecting the obesity epi-
demic, it is difficult to see how the expertise of the Health Board would
not have been utilized in making the decision to implement such regula-
tion.  Furthermore, the mere presence of various exceptions to a regula-
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tion does not itself make the regulation arbitrary and capricious.  The
reasoning behind exceptions must be considered, and for the Soda Ban,
the grounds for exceptions were legitimate.
While the New York State courts’ decisions suspending the Ban
were a disappointing setback, the Soda Ban still has hope given that the
New York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the appeal.  Further, even if
the Court of Appeals does not reverse the lower court’s decision, a first-
time failure to implement one type of soda ban does not in any way
indicate that all types of soda bans or soda regulation will be rejected.
There are several potential solutions for the problems identified by the
courts that suspended the Soda Ban.  First, the Board could attempt to
coordinate with the Department of Agriculture to implement a citywide
regulation, and provide further scientific basis for its sixteen-ounce size
limit.  Alternatively, instead of banning sodas larger than sixteen-ounces,
the Board could attempt to develop a pricing regulation that resembles a
proportional pricing of sodas.
Moreover, once a soda ban is crafted to survive a Borealis analysis
through the simple mechanisms outlined above, it should not be vulnera-
ble to other constitutional challenges.  As argued by Professor Michael
Dorf of Cornell Law School, a similar type of ban would be upheld under
the federal Constitution.241  Because the Soda Ban, if implemented,
might well achieve sufficient benefits to offset any inconveniences im-
posed on customers and any losses imposed on vendors, New York City
should not abandon its goal of implementing a soda regulation.  In this
way the Soda Ban could be similar to New York State’s Clean Indoor
Air Act of 2003 in terms of eventual impact and reception.  The 2003
Clean Indoor Air Act—New York’s statewide ban on smoking in bars
and restaurants—was a legislative attempt to protect second-hand smok-
ers.  Like the Soda Ban, the Clean Indoor Air Act was enacted with an
ultimate focus on public health.  While the Act prohibits indoor smoking
in various venues—places of employment, bars, restaurants, public trans-
portation, schools, general hospitals—it is not without exceptions: the
Act exempts places like private homes, hotel, retail tobacco businesses,
and up to 25% of outdoor seating areas in restaurant without roof or
241 Mike Dorf, A Federal Constitutional Right to Soda?  Fat Chance, DORF ON LAW
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/03/a-federal-constitutional-right-to-soda.html
(concluding, prior to the disposition of the Appellate Division on the Soda Ban, that “even if
the NY ruling is affirmed on appeal, the federal Constitution would allow a similar sugary-
drink ban in a jurisdiction that permits it under state law.”); see also Susan Saulny, Rejecting
Constitutional Claims, Judge Upholds Smoking Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2004) http://www
.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/nyregion/rejecting-constitutional-claims-judge-upholds-smoking-
bans.html (reporting on federal court in Manhattan upholding the constitutionality of New
York City’s Smoke Free Air Act and New York State’s Clean Indoor Air Act).
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ceiling.242  In 2003, when the law was first enacted, 76% of non-smoking
adults supported the law, whereas only 28% of smokers were in favor.243
In 2009, however, 87% of non-smokers supported the law, and support
among smokers had doubled, increasing to 58%.244  Perhaps the public’s
strong view against the Soda Ban before its enactment would similarly
subside following implementation, upon recognition of the health bene-
fits of the measure.245
242 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, A Guide to The New York State Clean Indoor Air Act, http://
www.health.ny.gov/publications/3402 (last updated May 2011).
243 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NEW YORK STATE’S CLEAN INDOOR AIR ACT: TEN YEARS
LATER AND GOING STRONG (July 2013), http://www.health.ny.gov/prevention/tobacco_control/
reports/statshots/volume6/ciaa_2013_10_year_report.pdf.
244 Id.
245 See Andrea Elliott, Bars and Restaurants Thrive Amid Smoking Ban, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/29/nyregion/bars-and-restaurants-
thrive-amid-smoking-ban-study-says.html; Don Cazentre, Ten Years Later, New York’s Smok-
ing Ban Barely Raises a Puff of Discontent, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.syra
cuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/08/ten_year_later_new_yorks_smoking_ban_raises_barely_a_
puff_of_discontent.html (illustrating that in the long run, many bar and restaurant owners have
hardly noticed any economic effects of the Clean Indoor Air Act.  Although, according to a
Syracuse bar owner, “[i]t probably took a little nibble (lost business) in the first few years, . . .
in the long term I don’t think it made much difference.”  Also, according to another proprietor,
although the “transition was tough,” “[i]n the end, when the dust settled, it’s been a good thing,
obviously.  People smoke less when they have to get up and go inside.”).
